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Coca has been a controversial concept entangled in a complex web of conflicting political rhetoric; existing
simultaneously as a sacred icon to unite the Andean nations, and as a serious scourge on humanity, fraught
with social  and economic danger to be exterminated for the good of mankind. Labeled by the United
Nations as a narcotic, it has been a principal target of the hegemonic ideology of the War on Drugs, which
has in turn legitimized a brutal eradication program upon the Andean people. At the start of the millennium,
protests against  neoliberal  imperialism coalesced into a  movement united behind coca, that  resulted in
government resignation and the election of coca farmer Evo Morales to the presidency in 2006. Since then
Bolivia has enacted the community driven cato program, which has allowed a set amount of coca to be
grown for each registered farmer in return for their collaboration in the fight against cocaine production.
Using an expanded version of Galtung's conception of violence, this project examines the results of the
program. The project finds the cato program to be a success as it has nearly eradicated illicit coca and
improved the livelihoods of the farmers and their communities. However the strict prohibitionist ideology
still  held by the Bolivian government threatens instability further down the commodity chain. I instead
recommend that the ideology and principles that built the cato program be exported to other regions.
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“How do we recognize the shackles that tradition has placed upon us?
For if we can recognize them, we are also able to break them.” - Franz Boas1
Coca has been a controversial concept entangled in a complex web of conflicting political
rhetoric; existing simultaneously as a sacred icon to unite the Andean nations,2 and as a serious
scourge on humanity, fraught with social and economic danger to be exterminated for the good
of mankind.3 In Western4 mythology, coca is recognized as both the salient ingredient in the
world’s most famous brand, and as the source of the most infamous recreational drug, cocaine.
Despite being as mild as a cup of tea,5 coca has been a target of aggressive rhetoric since its first
encounter with colonization. Labeled by the United Nations as a narcotic, it has been a principal
target of the hegemonic ideology of the  War on Drugs, which has in turn legitimized a brutal
eradication program upon the Andean people. 
1 As quoted in Fairclough, 1989: 1
2  Chapter VII, Section II, Article 384 of the 2009 Bolivian Constitution
3  Article 26 of the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs
4  The West will refer to Europe and the Anglophone States, despite Bolivia being geographically in the western
hemisphere. See: Hall, 1992
5  Pope Francis reportedly drank mate de coca on his July, 2015 trip to Bolivia. For the physiological effects of coca
compared to cocaine, refer to Page 07: “Coca.”
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The binary rhetoric of the War on Drugs has become a construct of the Manichean battle
of  good and evil,  a  divine  crusade between  drug lords and  drug czars,  fighting against  the
plague of  narcotics to haplessly enslaved consumers  (Gootenberg,  2006: 321). This signifier
drug does not denote any objective or naturalistic category, but rather politicized categorizations,
designated  to  conform  to  twentieth  century  morals  and  norms.  Loaded  with  preconceived
notions; as a drug coca has the indeterminacy of the pharmakon6 which can simultaneously be
translated as both a poison and a remedy (Derrida, 1972: 70). If coca were instead classified as a
food or a  drink, foreign intervention would be absurd, while the polysemous  drug justifies the
exercise of power,  whether as a  medicine to be prescribed or as a  narcotic to be eliminated
(Derrida, 1995: 230).
The ambivalent materiality of drugs… Under international law, cocaleros and coqueros7
are  labeled  as  criminals,  stigmatized  at  the  state  and global  level  for  their  purported  moral
failings, and subjugated to strict disciplinary actions. They have become the 'unworthy victims'8
of the deterritorialized War on Drugs, which has made them deserving of this global exercise of
police power and imperial sovereignty (Hardt & Negri, 2000: 38). Alternatively, in their own
local communities they are ordinary campesinos,9 and any arrest or destruction of their crops is
itself seen as illegitimate and met with resistance.
In the hegemonic ideology, coca is demoted to a “green smudge on a satellite image,” a
statistic to be wiped out as the perceived weakest link in the anti-drug crusade (Pereira, 2010:
398). The detrimental effects of this perspective culminated in Bolivia with what the government
dubbed Plan Dignidad. Heralded as a success because it was able to nearly eliminate illegal coca
cultivation, the high humanitarian costs of this illiberal program led to nationwide civil unrest,
government resignation and the election of former  cocalero  Evo Morales to the presidency in
6 Classical Greek translation of “Drug”
7 Coca growers and coca chewers, respectively
8 Chomsky & Herman, 1988: 47
9 Spanish for peasants. In Bolivia referring mostly to the indigenous peoples.
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2005 (Thoumi, 2005b: 196). His campaign utilized the thing-power of coca; the aliveness and
vitality of the material itself, to unite the campesinos against the established power structures.
Cato
In response to the uprising, the government gave in to the demands of Morales and the
Sindicatos Cocaleros del Trópico de Cochabamba,10 in 2004. These new amendments to the
Bolivian coca law would increase the area of legally grown coca from 12,000 to 20,000 hectares
nationally, while allowing around 7,000 hectares of coca in the Chapare. The government would
allow each  cocalero  to cultivate one  cato of coca,11 which gives them a household income of
around $100 a month. The cocaleros were to be further allotted a loan to plant alternative crops,
which could reduce their dependency on coca as the crops matured. In return, the  sindicatos
agreed to cooperate in reducing any excess coca within their jurisdiction, to collaborate in the
fight against trafficking, and to allow further eradication within the boundaries of the adjacent
national parks (Grisaffi, 2010: 434). The sindicatos are divided into six federations representing
more than 40,000 families (Grisaffi & Ledebur, 2014: 3). In order to gain the authorization to
grow a cato, each member of a sindicato has to acquire a land title, register for a biometric ID
card and have their cato measured and logged by the state monitoring institution (ibid: 4).
The policy change has been heavily criticized by the US and Western observers, that the
policy change is 'probably' a smokescreen "to justify the production of coca for cocaine,12" and
that the policy would “lead to a narco-state that supports the uncontrolled cultivation of coca.”13
In September 2015, the White House (2015) 'decertified' Bolivia for the eighth consecutive year,
declaring that Bolivia has “failed demonstrably during the previous 12 months to adhere to [its]
obligations under international narcotics agreements.” Mary O'Grady (2013) for the Wall Street
10 Referred to in English as the “Chapare Coca Growers (cocalero) Union
11  A cato of coca is around a tenth of a hectare, or 16002 meters (Grisaffi, 2010: 433).
12 Then US Ambassador to Bolivia David Greenlee (Lifsher, 2003).
13 US General James T. Hill (Youngers & Rosin, 2005: 353)
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Journal  alleged that  Bolivia  has become a “rogue state,”  saying that “President Morales has
turned Bolivia into an international hub of organized crime and a safe haven for terrorists.”
Conflict Transformation 
In principle, Bolivia's cato program fits well into the Peace Studies14 paradigm of conflict
transformation, which posits that:
...contemporary conflicts require more than the reframing of positions and the identification of win-win
outcomes. The very structure of parties and relationships may be embedded in a pattern of conflictual
relationships that extend beyond the particular site of conflict. Conflict transformation is therefore a process
of  engaging  with  and  transforming  the  relationships,  interests,  discourses  and,  if  necessary,  the  very
constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent conflict. (Miall, 2004: 70)
As there is a dearth of data at the nexus between illicit commodity control and peace
research, we must theorize what it may entail. Control policies that fit within this context would
not consist of blanket forced eradication and strict interdiction, but rather collaboration between
those involved in the illicit market, states and international organizations to provide sufficient
alternatives for both production and use of the substances.
The ideology of the War on Drugs leaves little hope for a non-zero sum outcome, as there
will always be an Other unworthy of negotiation. As Franz Fanon (1961: 38) said, “the colonial
world is a world cut in two,” and a transformative approach must challenge this discourse to
bridge the divide. As long as there is this conception of an evil to be eradicated, peace will never
fully be realized (Crick,  2012:  2).  As long as the demand exists,  supply will  never  be fully
controlled and harsher interdiction will only lead to higher levels of violence.
The strict prohibitionist ideology of the  War on Drugs is countered by the ideology of
harm minimization (Ritter  & Cameron,  2006).  Harm minimization policies  are  built  on  the
14 Following the ethos of my Peace Studies program, this paper uses a multidisciplinary approach, drawing from
philosophy,  linguistics,  pharmacology,  history,  economics,  anthropology,  sociology,  law,  and  Neo-Marxist
international politics.
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assumption that psychoactive substance use is inevitable, and the rights of all stakeholders must
be respected. To lower the demand for these commodities, the right social structures must be in
place to dissuade abuse, while providing the right treatment opportunities to allow for integration
of abusers into society.
Project Motivation
During the Fall of 2012 I was a teacher in a small Colombian town on the cocaine supply
route between South and Central America. While I was there I witnessed the power the local
gangs had over the population, my students, and the impotence of law enforcement. Although not
given much attention in the global media, Latin America is one of the most violent regions in the
world. Many Latin American cities and countries have higher [direct] violent deaths per capita
than the Middle Eastern war zones.15 While the money from the cocaine market cannot be said to
be  the  sole  cause  of  this  violence,  removing  the  economic  motivation  and  obstruction  to
development  would  have  a  profound  effect  on  the  Latin  American  people  and  improving
North/South homogenization.16
In  2016,  the  UN will  hold  a  special  session  to  address  the  shortcomings  of  current
international substance control policy. This session was called by a collation of Latin American
states that have suffered the highest casualties from the War on Drugs, and demand a reform of
the current strict prohibition policies. In recent years, many countries have deviated from past
conventions and established licit markets for regulated commodities. While the results of these
experiments have been promising,  they are against  international regulations and thus subject
these countries to a reduction in development aid and economic sanctions.
While there has been considerable research on the immense violence associated with the
global illicit substance market, the nature of strict global prohibition offers few cases to explore
15 UNODC homicide rate compared with Uppsala conflict data program
16 Although recently overtaken by terrorism fears, trafficking has historically been the primary rhetorical device for
greater border security and tighter controls on immigration (see Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 2010).
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any viable alternatives. Being one of the few countries in the world to create a licit market for a
substance regulated by UN conventions, Bolivia offers a unique case study to observe the effect
of further market liberalization. As it has been more than a decade since the implementation of
the cato program, the current situation should show us an accurate representation of the effects of
this more collaborative approach.
Research Overview
As an attempt to transcend the aforementioned labels and preconceptions, this project
will  construct  a  concept  of  coca  more  appropriate  for  post-colonial  discourse.  Using  this
framework I will analyze Bolivia's approach to their coca conflict, as to whether it is leading to a
truly transformative and peaceful solution, or unilaterally legalizing drug production. 
Research Objectives:
1) Develop a socio-biological understanding of both coca and cocaine.
3) Analyze Bolivia's cato program within the Peace Studies framework.
The remainder of this chapter will be to understand the psychopharmacological properties
of coca and cocaine and the methods used to go from the former to the later. In Chapter 02, I will
construct a genealogy of coca to understand its thing-power in the assemblage of global politics.
Then, in Chapter 03 I will outline the methods used in this project. Chapter 04 will develop a
framework of commodity control using the peace studies framework, using the framework of
human rights and international law. In Chapter 05 I will present the data of the research and the
analysis  using  this  framework.  In  Chapter  06  I  will  conclude  my  research  and  appeal  to
transform the current ideology to one of harm minimization and human rights. 
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Pharmacology
What is it that is not poison? All things are poison and nothing is without poison. It is the dose only that
makes a thing not a poison. - Paracelsus
On his  study of  the  effects  of  mercury  on  miners  in  the  sixteenth  century,  botanist
Paracelsus made the observation that has since become the foundation of the field of toxicology,
that “the dose makes the poison” (Frank & Ottoboni, 2011: 32-33). This section will detail the
pharmacological  aspects  of  coca  and  cocaine  hydrochloride  to  explain  how  the
pharmacokinetics17 of traditional coca consumption prevents any negative effects from cocaine
ingestion. While the thing-power of coca cannot be reduced to a sum of its parts, its transience to
cocaine has their fates inextricably linked.
Coca
There are  between seventy-five and two hundred and fifty species  of  the  subtropical
Andean shrub  Erythroxylum  (Erythroxylaceae) spread  throughout the lowlands of the western
Amazon basin (Plowman, 2014). Early pre-Colombian civilizations noticed the psychological
effect of the alkaloids present in the leaves of the shrub and over time domesticated two species
in the family,  E. coca and  E. novogranatense.  The first  archeological  evidence of  coca leaf
cultivation is dated to the Andean region in Ecuador to around 2000 BC (Plowman, 2014: 72).
Coca cultivation today is focused in the Andean region of Colombia, Peru and Bolivia for both
licit and illicit use. Huánuco or Bolivian coca (E. coca) is generally cultivated between 500 and
2000m elevation, although the best quality and highest yields are produced at l000 to 1500 m
(Plowman, 2014: 80). The one to two meter plant does not require fertilizer, suffers from few
pest problems due to its high alkaloid content, grows well in impoverished soils, and can be
harvested three or four times a year (Hellin, 2001). 
17 How the substance is absorbed.
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The dried, cured leaf of the plant, known as la hoja de coca or simply coca, is consumed
locally throughout the Andean regions of South America.  Although commonly referred to as
‘chewing’ in both English and Spanish, the coquero rather sucks the wad of coca leaves wedged
in between their cheek and gums. Additionally, a powdered alkaline ash or lime is periodically
added to flavor to the otherwise bitter wad and to enhance the perceived effects (Gootenberg,
2008: 16). 
With the case of coca, the difference in toxicity between traditional consumption and
illicit  use  is  dependent  completely  on  the  route  of  administration.  With  traditional  coca
consumption,  ingestion  of  the  metabolites  are  slow.  It  takes  five  minutes  for  cocaine  to  be
detectable in the blood, and two hours to reach peak concentrations in the brain (Nutt, 2012:
181). Little is known on the pharmacological effects of this route of administration as it has been
difficult to obtain UN approval for a detailed long-term study on the effects of traditional coca
consumption  (Plowman,  2014:  100).  Notwithstanding,  some  of  the  reported  physiological
positive effects of use are on altitude acclimatization, social cohesion, nutritional benefits, and
increased energy. 
A report conducted on the effects of traditional coca consumption by the World Health
Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute
(UNICRI) concluded that the “use of coca leaves appears to have no negative health effects and
has  positive  therapeutic,  sacred  and  social  functions  for  indigenous  Andean  populations”
(UNICRI/WHO, 1995, 7). Twenty years after completion, the organizations have not yet made
this report available to the public.18
Early reports  on  coca  leaf  consumption  alleged that  the  leaf  was  responsible  for  the
malnutrition  witnessed  amongst  the  coqueros due  to  its  hunger  suppressing  characteristics.
However, this assumption has not held up to scientific scrutiny (Plowman, 2014: 93). The earlier
studies on the negative effects of traditional coca consumption were done by equating the total
18  The  report  is  listed  as  “restricted”  on  their  website:  WHO  UNICRI  COCAINE  PROJECT
http://tinyurl.com/UNICRI-WHO1995. The quote here was from the Briefing Kit. However the full report has been
published by Wikileaks.
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amount of cocaine consumed over a long period with a single dose of cocaine (UNESCO, 1950;
Gutierrez-Noriega,  1952).  The only measurable  negative effect  of  prolonged traditional  coca
consumption is with dental pathologies relating to the vasoconstricting19 property of the cocaine
alkaloid on the gums.  A comparative anthropological  study by Langsjoen (1996) has  shown
dental pathologies to be more common in populations where coca consumption is prevalent. 
Cocaine
In a speech to the UN General Assembly on 19 September, 2006, Morales pleaded with
the  international  community  to  disassociate  their  conception  of  coca  from  the  common
hegemonic mythology of cocaine, as coca is culturally, anthropologically and politically a very
different substance from its cocaine isolate. However, in order for coca to benefit the Andean
people as a legal global commodity, it is important to contextualize the ongoing stigmatization of
its principal component.
Fourteen different alkaloids have been isolated from the coca leaf (Burchard, 1975). The
benzoylmethylecgonine  alkaloid,  commonly  known as  cocaine,  makes  up  around 0.1  to  0.8
percent of its weight.20 In the Chapare, the cocaine alkaloid content can go much higher, as was
shown in one sample of coca leaf that measured 1.2 percent (DEA, 1993). Studies on the effects
of cocaine show the alkaloid to be mainly responsible for the anesthetic and stimulating effects
reported by coca chewers, as research conducted using the other alkaloids present in the leaf
have shown no noticeable psychoactive effect (ibid).21
While the pharmacokinetics22 of traditional coca consumption may prevent any negative
effects of cocaine administration, the isolated alkaloid is much more prone to abuse. The cocaine
19 The narrowing or constricting of blood vessels can cause gum disease (periodontitis).
20 Comparatively, morphine and codeine together make up around fifteen percent of the opium poppy, while the
THC content of the cannabis flower is around five percent. 
21  Pereira, 2010: “You can never be quite sure whether you are constructing your reaction to the plant based on the
effect of its alkaloids, or whether you are simply reacting to your perception of what this effect should be. As
Henman states: ‘the effectiveness of the alkaloids is dependent to a greater degree on the biological and mental state
of the coca chewer, than it is on the actual pharmacological properties of the leaves themselves’ (Antonil, 1978: 128)
22 Effect of the mode of consumption – Biological mechanism of absorption.
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hydrochloride salt  is often administered as a fine white powder and recreationally consumed
through insufflation or injection. With a vaporizing temperature (smoking point) of 200°C, the
salt form of cocaine HCl cannot be consumed through inhalation. In order for cocaine to be
smoked, it must first be converted into a base by heating it with sodium bicarbonate and water.
Known as “crack” cocaine, the base can be smoked as it has a much lower vaporizing point (100
°C). The pharmacodynamics23 of crack and cocaine are the same, while the pharmacokinetics put
the intensity of effect between insufflation and injection.
Taken in excess there are a myriad of potential medical complications associated with
cocaine abuse. Its vasoconstricting properties can cause heart attacks, seizures, pulmonary edema
or a ruptured aorta, while prolonged use can result in myocardial fibrosis.24 As cocaine can also
increase  thromboxane  production,  users  are  at  risk  of  blood clots.  Abuse  can  also  result  in
psychosis manifesting as paranoia, delusions, and formication.25 Excessive snorting can lead to
ulcers in the nasal cavity or a perforated septum. Unclean injection can lead to necrosis, which in
severe cases can only be treated with amputation. Also, using cocaine while pregnant carries an
eight times higher risk of Sudden Infant Death Syndrome. (Nutt, 2012: 184). 
Although  cocaine  is  absorbed  while  chewing  coca,  cocaine  insufflation,  or  crack
inhalation,  the  pharmacokinetic  properties  of  the  route  of  admission  determine  how quickly
cocaine  reaches  the  brain.  Furthermore,  the  route  of  ingestion  also  determines  the  total
bioavailability  of  cocaine.  Injection  has  the  highest  bioavailability  and  fastest  absorption,
followed by smoking, insufflation, and coca chewing respectively. This is why cocaine at the
minute doses ingested from coca chewing has shown no negative physiological effect on the
user.  One  study has  shown a  beneficial  effect  of  treating  cocaine  addiction  with  coca  leaf
chewing, as it may work in a similar mechanism as the nicotine patch (Hurtado-Gumucio, 2000).
As Paracelsus observed, "every element in nature has its own poison and its antidote" (Frank &
Ottoboni, 2011: 32-33)
23 Effect of the chemical – Biological mechanism of action.
24 Normal heart muscle is replaced with fibrous tissue so the heart cannot pump blood properly
25 The feeling of tiny bugs running along the surface of one’s skin
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Extraction
“A grape is a grape and through a long process you make wine.
Coca is coca and through a long process you make cocaine."- Leonilda Zurita
The chemical process involved in the extraction and processing of cocaine from the coca
leaf is a three-step process that increases in complexity with every step. The first of the process is
conducted in crude jungle refineries littering the riverbanks in the Chapare,26 whereas the second
and third steps are conducted elsewhere in Bolivia or Brazil. 
The extraction from coca to cocaine27 (coca) paste or pichicata is a relatively simple, low
yield  extraction  procedure.  The  cocaleros sell  their  crop  of  dried  leaves  to  the  pichicateros
(paste-makers) for around $2 per kilogram.28 The dried leaves are then taken away from the
towns to river beds, which allow the excess chemicals to runoff. A tarp is laid out over a large
vat, filled with coca leaves, and the leaves are soaked in a diluted sulfuric acidic solution to
extract the alkaline cocaine. Young men, who are known as pisa cocas, stomp on the acidic coca
mulch for several hours to mix up the solution (CIA, 1993). The liquid coca juice is removed,
filtered, and mixed with a lime or carbonate to neutralize the acid. Kerosene is then added to the
now alkaline solution, and the process is repeated three to five times. Known as the Colombian
method, woodchippers and cement mixers are increasingly being used instead of human labor to
save  time  and  for  a  more  efficient  extraction.  The  pichicata is  then  sold  to  a  wholesaler
(rescatista) and exported out of the Chapare (Grisaffi, 2014). 
The second step is more complicated than the former and is used to extract the cocaine
from the 40% pichicata solution. This step uses kerosene, ether, acetone, ammonium hydroxide,
and potassium permanganate to further purify the solution. The resulting product is a near 100%
26 The source of this information was from mainly from my interview with UMOPAR officer Luis who gave me a
step by step instruction of the extraction process using siezed equitptment. CIA, 1993 details the same process.
27 It  is referred to as both coca paste and cocaine paste in the literature. The difference in usage appears to be
political.
28 Cocaleros thus make around $200 from the $71,000 retail price of a kilogram of cocaine sold in the United States
(Caulkins, 2014: 19). 
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cocaine base, which is filtered, dried, packaged and sent to a crystal laboratory (CIA, 1993).
Known as  basuco,29 cocaine base can either be smoked as is,30 or further be converted to the
cocaine  hydrochloride.  The conversation  is  a  multi-step process  that  uses  hydrochloric  acid,
diethyl ether and acetone; all of which are difficult to obtain in South America. According to a
study conducted by the US Department of State, 75 and 110 kilograms of coca leaves yield one
kilogram of coca paste, two to four kilos of coca paste yield one kilo of base and one kilo of base
yields the same amount of cocaine HCL (Painter, 1994: 23).
To add to the Leonilda Zurita quote at the beginning of this section:
Sassafras is sassafras and through a long process you make MDMA.
Ephedra is ephedra and through a long process you make methamphetamine.
 Yet to this day coca and cocaine are classified equally under the UN system as Schedule
1  narcotics,  whereas sassafras and ephedra are not labeled as  drugs nor controlled under any
international convention. To understand this discrepancy, it is best to look beyond their chemical
compositions and instead at the historical context of their classifications.
29 Basuco means “little dirty trash” in Spanish.
30 Chemically similar to the“crack” or “freebase” cocaine common in the United States, basuco is also smoked in
low income neighborhoods of South American cities. 
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02 Genealogy
“If you want the present to be different from the past, study the past.”
- Baruch Spinoza
This chapter will construct a genealogy of the concept of “coca.” It will present how the
War on Drugs became the hegemonic ideology at the global level, and show how it contributes to
the same power imbalances and racism as that used during  colonization. Furthermore, it  will
present  the  discourse  used  by  the  Andeans  that  underlines  the  thing-power  of  the  coca
assemblage. The vibrant history of coca will be looked at from its mythological genesis in pre-
colonial Andean civilization, to its mid-nineteenth century rise as a global commodity, followed
by  its  twentieth  century  descent  into  worldwide  prohibition.  It  will  then  segue  into  coca's
political resurgence and altermodern impetus in Bolivian politics.
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Sacrament
“Indians from the Altiplano found their way over the crest of the mountains into the tropical rain
forests of the Yungas. Here they found rich and fertile land, good earth for their farmsteads and a
nature prodigal of vegetation. They set fire to the undergrowth in order to clear a little space for
their needs, but the fire they had set blazed and spread through the forest until it was seen like a
roaring inferno below. Khuno, the god of snow and storm, from his palaces on the snow-clad peaks
of Illimani and Illampu, saw the smoke rise up from the valleys and pollute his pure mansions of
ice. An angered Khuno hurled down hail and storm upon the valleys, wounding and rending the
earth. Coming out from the caves in which they had taken refuge from the storm, the guilty Indians
found nothing but desolation around them, nor was there any longer a path back to the highlands.
Wandering desolate and famished they found unknown plant of bright and brilliant green, of which
the wrath of the storm-god had been unable to destroy. Gathering the leaves of this plant, they
placed them in their mouths to stay the pangs of hunger, and immediately they were invaded by a
sense of supreme well-being. They no longer felt the hunger, the weariness, or the cold. Refreshed
with  new  energy  they  returned  to  Tiahuanaco  to  reveal  the  secret  of  this  marvelous  plant”
(Osborne, 2013: 238).
Durkheim’s  (1912)  sacred/profane  dichotomy  is  a  difficult  moral  paradigm  to
conceptualize to many indigenous peoples (Goody, 1961: 148). In the Quechua tradition, it is
difficult to find a equivalent of the profane, as there is no easy analytical distinction between
religious ritual and everyday life (Goody, 1961: 144). Every activity, thing, or relationship was
thought of as sacred, worthy of the highest place on Durkheim’s totem, each possessing a unique
mythology and guardian spirit. To the Quechua, the closest thing to the profane was a debt or
obligation to society, which carried with it no real negative connotation (Harrison, 1994: 100). To
outside observers however, coca use in all forms has been predominantly viewed as profane, a
drug, serving as both the cause and a symptom of the social and economic problems faced by the
disparate population (Allen, 1981: 158).
Coca consumption once spanned the South American continent. Fragmented by the dense
Amazonian  rainforest  and  Andean  mountain  range,  the  surviving  mythologies  of  these  Pre-
Colombian coca consuming civilizations share many common characteristics.  To the various
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traditions, coca is feminine, associated with the mother or life-giver, usually anthropomorphized
as a female god (Antonil, 1978). 
Although largely eradicated throughout much of the continent, the modern resurgence of
coca has largely been focused in the south Andean region,1 where sophisticated civilizations have
cultivated coca for millennia (Kohl & Farthing, 2006: 37). To the Quechua and Aymara, Mama
Coca, the esteemed daughter of Pachamama, has been a symbol of the female gender and sexual
indulgence, as the guardian of fertility and reproductivity (Steele, 2004: 21). The above genesis
myth from the Aymara frames coca as a protector of the Andean people, brought up from the
Amazonian valleys below. 
From cultivation coca is revered, “The very picking of the leaves is for itself already a
reflection of worship towards the plant. If done rashly or inconsiderate, the extremities of the
branch can be damaged and this is considered as a bad sign out of laziness or bad technique”
(Antonil, 1978: 152).  Appropriate handling requires time, patience and the repetition of the same
movements, to be respected throughout its consumption (Heitzeneder, 2010: 40).
The Quechua measure humanity based on the concept of reciprocity, or Ayni (Mannheim,
1986: 268). The Inca had no monetary system or market economy; everything was supplied by
the community or in times of crisis, the State. Although today markets are commonplace,  Ayni
still has a hold over the life of the Quechua, “[human beings] live and work, eat and marry, drink
and pray, think and fight in a universe governed by reciprocity,” and those who live without this
concept  are  the  “naked,  uncivilized,  uncultured”  (Mannheim,  1986:  268).  Coca  plays  an
important role in this reciprocity, as a request for help in Andean society is never asked without
first offering a handful of the leaf (Hurtado Gumucio, 1995). Coca is thus a symbol of the gift
economy, of which Marcel Mauss (1954) has labeled as a total social fact of many indigenous
societies, an indispensable aspect of life intertwined within its totality (see Spedding, 1997). 
1 Although coca is still consumed by indigenous groups in the north of Colombia.
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Vice
 “The  colonized  is  elevated  above his  jungle  status  in  proportion  to  his  adoption  of  the  mother
country's cultural standards…” ― Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks
Coca has had a turbulent relationship with its Spanish colonizers. Unlike tobacco and
coffee, traditional consumption of coca was never fully embraced by Europeans, as it was seen as
aesthetically  repulsive,  possibly  because  it  was  unlike  any  previously  known  ritual  of
psychoactive  substance  ingestion  (Gootenberg,  2008).  Attempts  at  exporting  coca  to  Europe
proved  challenging,  as  the  leaf  would  lose  its  potency over  the  long  journey and  thus  any
mention of its  magical properties would be dismissed by its European observers (Nutt, 2012:
182). In the colonies, the consumption of coca became a source of stigmatization and racism
from its first encounter with the new world settlers. The first recorded interaction between the
colonizers and coqueros was in the journal of the immortalized2 Amerigo Vespucci:
They all keep their mouths filled with a certain green herb, which they ruminate, in almost the
same manner as animals, so that they are hardly able to utter a word. Also, around their necks
they all of them carry two dried calabashes, one filled with the herb which they have in their
mouths, and the other with a certain white flour like powdered plaster. With a little stick, which
they moisten and chew in the mouth, and frequently dip into the flour calabash, they take out
enough to sprinkle on both sides of the herb, which they carry, an operation, which they repeat
frequently, and very slowly. 
The rhetoric of the colonizer served to dehumanize, using zoological terms to paint their
portrait of the colonized as a nonhuman, ruminating beast (Memmi, 1965: 131).
Coca’s integration in the virulent Inca religion and culture was seen as a pertinent threat
to the colonizers. Christianity was a necessary technology of the colonizers to homogenize and
control the colonized population (Smith, 1999: 49). The Spanish Church thus became coca’s first
and most vocal political critic, dismissing all of coca’s alleged energizing and healing powers as
2 Who has had two continents named after him: the Americas
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devilish witchcraft (Gootenberg, 2008: 19). Anti-coca rhetoric was often used to disparage the
indigenous population, frequently taking on racial undertones:
When I asked some of the Indians why they always had their mouth full of this plant, which they
don't eat, but merely keep in their mouth, they said they do not feel hunger, and it gives them great
strength  and  vigor.  I  think  it  probably does  something  of  the  sort,  though  it  seems  to  me  a
disgusting habit, what might be expected of people like these Indians. 
The first colonial attempt at an eradication program began in 1569 after a decree from the
diocese (Nutt, 2012: 182). However, as the natives in the mining sector were refusing to work
without coca, cultivation continued. Even for the clergy, the economic motivation seemed to
outweigh the ideological.3 The stimulating and hunger-suppressing characteristics of coca led to
greater  productivity  from the  malnourished and overworked population.  According to  writer
Eduardo Galeano, “for the few coins they received for their work the Indians bought coca-leaf
instead of food: chewing it, they could— at the price of shortening their lives— better endure the
deadly tasks imposed on them” (1971: 47).
As coca was rare and demand was inflated, the leaves were often used in place of gold
(Hurtado Gumucio,  1995).  The colonizers  realized the economic benefits  of coca cultivation
greatly outweighed the costs of a resilient population and began production on an industrialized
scale. Heavily taxed and regulated, coca quickly became a valuable local commodity for the
Spaniards and stayed that way throughout the colonial period (Nutt, 2012: 182). The Spanish had
transformed coca, according to Galeano (1971: 47), to a tool of oppression while their owners
denigrated the campesinos for their “maleficent vices.” 
3 "The greater part of the revenue of the Bishops of and Canons of the Cathedral of Cusco is derived from the tithes
of the coca leaves," Garcilaso de la Vega 1501-1536
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Commodity
In  the  mid-nineteenth  century,  there  was  a  worldwide  effort  to  demystify  coca  by
understanding its psychoactive properties (Gootenberg,  2008: 322). First  isolated in the sixth
decade of the nineteenth century, cocaine was initially lauded as a panacea. The psychoanalyst
Sigmund Freud became one of its earliest proponents, publishing five papers between 1884 and
1887 detailing the effects of the isolate and its uses as a stimulant, an anesthetic, and as a virtual
cure-all. Some of the diseases Freud claimed to treat with cocaine were as varied as digestive
ailments, syphilis, asthma, and opiate addiction; of which none held up to later scientific scrutiny
(Gootenberg, 2008: 23). 
A coca  revolution  quickly engulfed  Europe  and the  Americas,  and  as  it  became the
principal ingredient in many popular patent medicines, beverages, and tonics, causing demand in
the  Andes  to  rise  sharply  (Pereira,  2010:  395).  Two  proprietary  products  dominated  the
international market:  Vin Mariani, a beverage consisting of wine and coca extract, which was
popular with Queen Victoria and Pope Leo XIII, and a well-known tonic consisting of coca and
the kola nut of West Africa known as Coca Cola (Nutt, 2012: 182).4
In the medical field, the discovery of cocaine turned out to be a major advancement for its
property as a local anesthetic. Through this medium cocaine helped revolutionize the practice of
surgery,  allowing  for  surgeries  on  delicate  areas  such  as  the  eyes,  throat,  or  genitals,  and
surgeries requiring patients to be conscious to be conducted painlessly (Gootenberg, 2009: 24).
Cocaine was commonly used in  the medical  field until  1905 with the synthesis  of  procaine
(Novocaine), which mimicked cocaine's anesthetic properties but lacked its euphoric effects.5
Regional instability meant that the supply could not keep up with international demand
until 1885. This marked a quarter century of coca serving as a classic export commodity, which
4  Coca Cola was itself a product of prohibition as it had to the remove the wine from its formula after Atlanta voted
to go dry. Its prominance grew with the temperance movement, as more and more counties went dry (Cohen, 2006:
67).
5 Novocaine's successor lidocaine is one of the primary adulterants found in street cocaine because its numbing
effect mirrors that of cocaine. (Lópéz-Artíguez, Cameán, & Repetto, 1995)
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became an integral part of the war torn6 Peruvian economy (Gootenberg, 2008: 55). At its height
coca was Peru’s fifth most remunerative export, on which the Andean nations are completely
dependent  (Gootenberg,  2008:  64).  However  by  the  early  twentieth  century,  production  of
cocaine began to shift to the Dutch Javanese colony. The commodity chain from the East Indies
was much better developed to Europe, and thus it was easier and more economically viable to
transport. As the market was unregulated, by 1907 the industrialized production of coca in the
Dutch Javanese colony had supplanted the Peruvian supply as the world leader (Gootenberg,
2009: 110).
Narcotic
As his own claim to social respect and honor are diminished, the sober, abstaining citizen seeks for
public  acts  through  which  he  may  reaffirm  the  dominance  and  prestige  of  his  way  of  life.
Converting the sinner to virtue is  one way;  law is another.  Even if the law is not enforced or
enforceable,  the  symbolic  import  of  it’s  passage  is  important  to  the  reformer.  It  settles  the
controversies between those who represent clashing cultures. The public support of one conception
of morality at  the expense of  another enhances the prestige and self-esteem of the victors and
degrades the culture of the losers. - Joseph Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade, 1986
The  hegemonic  mythological7 conception  of  coca  began  to  form  at  the  turn  of  the
twentieth  century in  the  United  States.  Coinciding with  the  temperance  movement,  growing
histeria over cocaine consumption by minorities8 led to the passing of the Harrison Tax Act in
1914 (Fukumi, 2008: 97). A social  movement spearheaded by  'moral entrepreneurs,  this law
banned the unregulated sale of coca and opium in the United States, and signaled the beginning
6 The Peruvians and Bolivians fought a war together (Guerra del Pacífico) against Chile from 1879 to 1883, and
lost decisively.
7 See the entry (Barthes, 1957: 58) “Wine and Milk”
8 “In 1900, the Journal of the American Medical Association published an editorial stating, "Negroes in the South
are  reported  as  being  addicted  to  a  new  form of  vice  –  that  of  'cocaine  sniffing'  or  the  'coke  habit.'”  Some
newspapers  later  claimed  cocaine  use  caused  blacks  to  rape  white  women  and  was  improving  their  pistol
marksmanship." (Cockburn, 1998: 176.5). For more on race and prohibition see: Cohen, 2006.
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of the prohibition era (Becker, 1963).9 Other countries soon followed suit, while allowing the
export supply from the Andean region to continue largely unabated. Throughout this time, the
rhetoric  of  domestic  cocaine  interdiction  was  largely  directed  towards  the  Italian-American
mafia, while the Andeans remained faceless suppliers (Fukumi, 2008: 97).
In 1950, the United Nations made its first official inquiry into the traditional use of coca
in Andean society. The report’s rhetoric reflected the colonial racism and cultural insensitivity of
the early Spanish colonizers:
“Coca chewing maintains a constant state of malnutrition; it induces in the individual undesirable changes of
an intellectual and moral character. It  certainly hinders the chewer's chances of obtaining a higher social
standard; it reduces the economic yield of productive work, and therefore maintains a low economic standard
of life” (Commission of Inquiry on Coca, 1951).
The report further refers to coca chewing as a dirty vice of the uneducated, and that only
through  educational  programs  coca  could  be  eradicated  (UN,  1951).  The  report  equated
traditional  coca  consumption  with  cocaine,  continuously referred  to  its  users  as  addicts and
implicated coca on the region’s widespread illiteracy (UN, 1951).
The UN acted on the report in 1961 by ratifying the first international treaty to combat the
cross-border illicit substance market, the UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.10 Ratified by
the then presidents of Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, the convention established that “the parties
shall so far as possible enforce the uprooting of all coca bushes which grow wild. They shall
destroy the coca bushes if illegally cultivated,” and, “coca chewing must be abolished within
twenty-five years” (Grisaffi, 2010: 13). The cocaleros were to cease all cultivation and facilitate
the complete eradication of a cultural icon their ancestors had been consuming for millennia.
9  This culture of prohibition, that if society deems a substance as  bad it should be abstained from completely,
appears to be a consequence of the Ambrahamic tradition. Pleasure was not sinful to the ancient Greeks, who instead
developed an ethics of moderation, or alimentary ethics to govern their indulgance in food and intoxicants (Foucault,
1984: 10). See: Duff, 2004.
10 The UN defines a “drug” as a “substance listed in Schedule I and II of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs” http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/illicit-drugs/definitions/
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The law established in Article 26 that “the parties shall so far as possible enforce the
uprooting of all coca bushes which grow wild. They shall destroy the coca bushes if illegally
cultivated,” and, “coca leaf chewing must be abolished within twenty-five years” (UN, 1961).
However  the  convention  made  one  exception  in  Article  27  at  the  behest  of  the  Coca  Cola
Company,  “the Parties may permit the use of coca leaves for the preparation of a  flavoring
agent” (UN, 1961).
Although this inclusion has been panned as an “historical error,” it has yet to be rectified
(Thoumi,  2005A:  5).  Peru  and  Bolivia  together  were  successfully  able  to  lobby  for  an
amendment in paragraph 2 of Article 14 of the second convention,  the 1988  United Nations
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances:
“The  measures  adopted  shall  respect  fundamental  human  rights  and  shall  take  due  account  of
traditional licit uses, where there is historic evidence of such use, as well as the protection of the
environment” (UN, 1988). 
However, the language of the revision was, according to Francisco Thoumi (2005a: 6),
“ambiguous  and  confusing,”  and  production  of  coca  products  in  these  countries  is  still
prohibited, as recognized by the International Narcotics Control Board in a 1994 release:
Thus, mate de coca, which is considered harmless and legal in several countries in South America, is
an illegal activity under the provisions of both the 1961 Convention and the 1988 Convention, though
that  was  not  the  intention  of  the  plenipotentiary  conferences  that  adopted  those  conventions
(International Narcotics Control Board, 1994).
In  order  to  resolve  this  confusion  and  rectify  the  now  widely  discredited  1950
Commission of Enquiry into the Coca Leaf, the INCB commissioned the WHO report mentioned
earlier in this chapter, which was later seen to be too controversial to publish (Bewley-Taylor,
2012: 257).
This second attempt at eradication was again thwarted by economic motivation, this time
by the resurgence of cocaine use. The early 1970s witnessed a sharp rise in the demand for
cocaine in the United States as it  quickly entrenched itself  as  its  biggest  import  market  (de
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Franco & Godoy, 1992: 384). Although it is unknown as to why cocaine became so popular in
the  United  States,  Waldorf  (1991:  281-82)  theorized  that  the  U.S.  was  "a  competitive,
achievement-addicted, 'Type-A society,' [in which] cocaine's ability to make us feel empowered,
euphoric, energetic, and ebullient fits our culture like a glove.” At this time, cocaine had an
image of glamour and status, the champagne of drugs consumed by the rich and famous. 
The  political  rhetoric  demanding  an  international  effort  to  eradicate  coca  and  fight
trafficking did not occur until cocaine expanded its availability to lower-income groups with the
emergence of ‘crack’ cocaine11 in the mid-1980s (Gereffi & Korzeniewicz, 1994: 300). As the
media and politicians continued to exaggerate the crack ‘crisis’ in underprivileged communities
within  the  United  States  (Reinarman  &  Levine,  1989),  international  legislators  passed  the
Convention against Illicit  Traffic in Narcotic Drugs12 to further action against this  perceived
threat. George H.W. Bush’s Andean Initiative in 1989 signaled an expansion of Richard Nixon’s
“War on Drugs” into production and transit countries, by further committing an extra 100 million
dollars into the military forces in the region. A country not complying with the US demands
would be met with a range of economic sanctions, from a suspension of foreign aid and trade
benefits, to a curtailment of air transportation (Mejia & Restrepo, 2014: 27).
The Andean countries struggled economically throughout the 1970s and 80s, Peru and
Colombia were engaged in civil wars, and the Bolivian economy was coming into one of the
most rapid hyperinflation periods in world history (Sachs, 1989: 279). In the 1970s, the coca
industry reached an all-time high for the Bolivian economy, totaling 15% of the country’s GDP
and 16% of its total labor force (Kohl & Farthing, 2006). As the coca export market was an
important part of their economy, the governments were both unable and unwilling to combat the
continuing rise in cocaine production and trafficking (ibid). In order to re-stabilize the Bolivian
economy after  the  crash,  the  Bolivian  government  adopted  the  New Economic  Plan  (NEP),
11  See page 8
12  See Above
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which along with a market crash in the tin industry, led to a marked increase in unemployment of
miners and laborers13 (Dunkerley, 1990: 34).
The growing coca market coupled with mass unemployment in the early 1980s led to a
mass migration of Andean coca farmers and laborers to the Chapare (Kohl & Farthing, 2006).
Although  coca  was  previously  grown  only  for  local  consumption  in  the  region,  cultivation
skyrocketed  from  an  estimated  13,000  hectares  in  1978  to  55,000  hectares  a  decade  later
(Painter, 1994: 15), while the coinciding population growth went from 24,000 in 1967 to around
350,000 in 1989 (Grisaffi, 2010: 429). Originally inhabited by South Amazonian ethnic groups,
the  immigration  of  Andean  peasants  into  the  Chapare  imported  the  dominate  culture  of  the
highlands, with coca cultivation remaining an integral part of everyday life (Grisaffi, 2010: 425).
In response, the government ratified Ley 1008, which fortified the position of the Yungas region
as the only legal coca growing region in Bolivia. The Chapare colonizers’ status as an uprooted
multicultural  population  meant  that  they  were  unable  to  claim  any  cultural  heritage  as
“traditional coca cultivators” (Grisaffi, 2010: 432).
According to  Grandin (2007:  216),  the  passing of  Ley 1008 occurred under  “intense
pressure” from the US government. In 1983, the U.S. provided $4 million to start the  Unidad
Móvil Policial para Áreas Rurales (UMOPAR), a military unit that deals with drug control in
rural  areas  (Dangl,  2007,  45).  In  contrast  to  the  United  States’ domestic  policy  of  Posse
Comitatus,  which forbids  the  military from acting as  law enforcement  personnel,  UMOPAR
quickly took on the duty of local law enforcement in the Chapare (Youngers & Rosin, 2004).
This coincided with a rapid militarization in all the Andean States with U.S. support (Zirnite,
1998).
Then a sindicato leader in the Chapare, these crimes motivated the movement of future
president Morales: 
13  “Official level of open unemployment stood at 11.5%, but the real level was undoubtedly several points higher -
probably 15%” (Dunkerley, 1990: 34)
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"I was a witness to how the gringos from the DEA fired upon us and the Villa Tunari massacre was made.
Later, we recovered cadavers drowned in the river and others with bullet wounds. It was all for the defense
of the coca leaf against Ley 1008." 
Over the next two decades, there were over sixty wrongful deaths attributed to the unit
and countless human rights abuses (Youngers and Rosin, 2004). The most obvious instance of
US subversion was the 1984 kidnapping of then President of Bolivia, Siles Zuazo, by UMOPAR
soldiers that lead to an unsuccessful coup d’état attempt against the Bolivian government. There
have  been  fourteen  successful  coups in  Bolivia  in  twentieth  century,  thus  there  was  little
attention paid by the international community. Cocaleros and security forces continued to clash
under an eradication program called Option Zero, from 1993 to 1997, and later the Dignity Plan
from 1998 to 2004 (Dangl, 2007, 45).
The anti-coca crusade in Bolivia culminated in 1997 with the adoption of Plan Dignidad,
or the Dignity Plan. Lauded as a success internationally for reducing the total amount of land
used for coca cultivation from 458 km² in 1997 to 146 km² in 2000. General Hugo Banzer,
former president of Bolivia, whose military dictatorship (1971-1978) not only engaged in serious
human rights violations and the assassination of opponents in foreign countries as part of the
Plan Condor, also contributed to Bolivia's initial specialization in cocaine production (Labrousse,
2003). He brought in the tradition of intertwining the upper echelons of the drug trade with the
highest levels of the country’s political and military power (Kohl & Farthing, 2010: 197).
From  the  mid-1980s  to  1997,  coca  and  semi-processed  cocaine  paste  provided  an
estimated U.S. $500 million a year or between 5 and 8 per cent of the Bolivian GDP, exceeding
all other agricultural products both in terms of value as well as in provision of jobs. Coca income
from peasant producers supported around 50,000 families, totaling between 120,000 and 500,000
campesinos (Kohl  & Farthing,  2006:  74).  Now left  with no livelihood and few options,  the
campesinos took to the streets.
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Icon
“Over the past two decades, Bolivian coca growers' leader Evo Morales has been beaten, tear gassed and
shot with rubber bullets at the hand of security forces while fighting for changes in Bolivia's drug policy. In
a stunning turnaround in January, now flanked by those same military forces, Morales was inaugurated as
Bolivia's new president” (Gordon, 2006: 15). 
Around the turn of the millennium, Bolivia was experiencing widespread civil  unrest
against what was viewed to be Western imperialism. The privatization of water, gas and an IMF-
imposed  income  tax  revitalized  a  renewed  indigenous  identity  movement  throughout  the
multitude (Hardt & Negri, 2009: 116). Evo Morales and his  Movement al Socialismo (MAS)
united these grassroots anti-imperialist organizations and effectively “replaced the state as the
mechanism of government” (Olivera, 2004: 81). As according to Hard and Negri (2009: 110),
“these struggles of the multitude are based in common organisational structures, that recent mass
mobilisations are not spontaneous but grew out of already existing networks and well-established
practices of self-government.”
The  death  of  two  cocaleros at  the  hands  of  government  eradication  forces  in  2004
sparked  massive  social  unrest  in  the  Chapare  (Grisaffi  &  Ledebur,  2014:  4).  “Morales
proclaimed the death of the “colonial state” and promised to move towards “a new plurinational,
autonomy and solidarity-based state” (Fuentes, 2010). The head of the Chapare Coca Growers
Union and the MAS political party Evo Morales, was elected president in a decisive victory in
2005.14 He ran on a platform to end the eradication programs and US imperialist influence in the
country. His regime enacted policies that would allow for limited coca growth, enough so the
cocaleros would  be  able  to  earn  a  living  wage  theoretically  without  having  to  rely  on  the
production of cocaine.
For the next two years the United States and the Morales' administration cooperated in
the fight against drug trafficking, until in 2008 when Bolivia expelled the US Ambassador and
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), for allegedly “meddling in the state's internal affairs”
14 Morales received 54% of the vote in a country where no party has  ever  scored more than 37% (Spence &
Shenkin, 2008: 344). 
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(Ledebur & Youngers, 2013: 2). Since the expulsion, the United States has condemned Bolivia's
eradication efforts year after year. 
In  the  Summer  2014,  Bolivia  was  entering  into  an  election  season in  which  the  two major
presidential  candidates  were  the  'revolutionary'  leftist  incumbent  Evo Morales  and staunchly
anti-cato and US 'favored' Jorge Quiroga. This is where my research begun.
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03 Methodology
“Peace is not the 'absence of war,' it is a virtue, a state of mind,
 a disposition of benevolence, confidence, justice.” - Spinoza
A transformative approach to the  War on Drugs cannot be measured solely by census
reports  and  statistics,  as  they  cannot  show  the  relationships,  memories,  and  context  of  the
conflict (Miall, 2004: 8). Cultural violence and oppression do not show up on the stats sheets,
while the extent of economic misery and physical violence may be misrepresented. However, by
simply using a qualitative approach this project would not be able to include other stakeholders
outside of the local area, nor take into account its feasibility of export  into other production
areas. For instance, the potential effect on the supply of the commodity is necessary for any
policy analysis. Furthermore, the language used in state and global discourse allows us to further
analyze the motivations of global prohibition and its exercise of power and violence.
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Study Area
The  Plurinational  State  of  Bolivia  is  home  to  one  of  the  most  ethnically  diverse
populations  in  the  world.  As  sociologist  René  Zavaleta  captured  in  the  1970s,  Bolivia  is  a
“sociedad  abigarrada,”1 which  can  be  translated  to  English  as  a  multi-colored  or  'motley'
society.2 Coming from over sixty different ethno-linguistic groups, over 60% of the population
identifies as indigenous (CIA, 2014). The country has historically suffered from a high level of
inequality between the Spanish-descendent upper class and the poorer indigenous  campesinos.
As one of the poorest countries in Latin America, cocaine has been a major player in Bolivia's
export dependent economy,3 since the mid-nineteenth century (Gootenberg, 2008). Its  cultural
pluralism is unlike any other country in the world, and its culture of sindicatos and autonomous
organization is perhaps unique to the plurinational state (Hardt & Negri, 2004: 108).
Coca cultivation in Bolivia predominantly takes place in two areas, the Chapare and the
Yungas regions. For over twenty years both regions were subjected to eradication programs and
are  now  managed  under  the  cato  program  (Farthing  &  Ledebur,  2015:  14).  However,  the
Bolivian  government  has  allowed  a  small  amount  of  coca  to  be  grown  for  traditional
consumption in  the Yungas region since 1988, whereas  prior  to  2004 all  coca grown in the
Chapare was illicit.  While in the Chapare the  cato program is widely favored for ending the
eradication  program,  the  opposite  is  true  in  the  Yungas  where  many of  the  cocaleros were
permitted to grow more than a cato of coca under the previous policy (Grisaffi, 2010: 434).
As I wanted to immerse myself in one area, I chose which, at the time has the most
influence in Bolivian politics. The Chapare, a semitropical region roughly the size of Wales in
the department of Cochabamba, is located around 200 kilometers down long mountainous roads
from its  administrative capital  (Farthing & Ledebur,  2015: 14).  Nearly encircled by national
1 Hardt and Negri (2009: 109) misspelt the word “socieda(e)d.” 
2  “Zavaleta views this social diversity in a negative light as a marker of Bolivia’s “premodern” character, as if
modernity were defined by homogeneous classes, identities, and social institutions” (Hardt & Negri, 2009: 108).
3  With a per capita GDP of only $5,500, Bolivia is considered to be a very poor country, ranked by the CIA (2014)
as number 156 in the world out of 228. PCE make up 48%.
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parks and a mountain range, the Chapare is, like virtually all regions in Bolivia, geographically
isolated. This is the region where the pre-2004 civil unrest was the most prominent and where
licensing has taken its greatest effect. Coca cultivation in the Chapare today is obvious, the farms
can be seen from the main road and the cut leaves are left out in the open to dry. All interviews of
growers, locals, and military personnel took place in this area.4
I was in the Cochabamba department for the entire six weeks of my fieldwork, alternating
between the department capital and the Chapare, staying mainly in dilapidated guesthouses with
no internet, forcing myself to immerse myself in Spanish-language literature and the lives of my
informants. Of course the relatively short amount of time I spent down there for this kind of
research and my lack of comfortness, with both the language and confidence with my project and
the questions I was asking, could both be seen as hindrances. Fortunately I was able to pair my
research with previous anthropological studies done in the area to paint an accurate picture of the
situation.
Informants
Cocalero 01 – Nicolas Cocalero
Cocalero 02 – Jose Cocalero
Campesino 01 – Willie Secondary Teacher
Campesino 02 – Miguel [Unknown]
UMOPAR01 Eduardo From Benin
UMOPAR02 Alejandro From La Paz
UMOPAR03 Luis From Santa Cruz
Juan Carlos Coca Administrator
Mergim Professor
Luisa Barista
4  In  the  cities:  Villa  Tunari  (local  vacation  spot),  Chimoré  (UMOPAR  headquaters),  Eterazama  (Centro  de
Formación Tecnológica Eterazama), Puerto Villarroel (river port with a Bolivian navy base).
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While  I  originally  planned  on  having  a  wider  range  of  interviewees,  I  conducted
interviews with  cocaleros,  coqueros,  and  narcopolicias.5 As I  struggled locating people with
other relevant professions, a gate keeper would have been particularly useful in this situation
(Bryman, 2008). I reached out to the Los sindicatos cocaleros del Trópico de Cochabamba, local
governance and the coca radio station through email, telephone, and in person without success. 
I was given assistance by a local technical college funded for alternative development,
the Centro de Formación Tecnológica Eterazama (CFTE), in the last days of my research, using
my social  network (see Rubin & Rubin,  2011:  89).6 Social  network research is  useful when
researching a sensitive topic, as it is comforting to potential research participants who “want to
identify a common person with whom they themselves and the researcher know as a way for
them to check the researcher's credibility and trustworthiness” (Liamputtong, 2008: 9).
As their profession is now legal, cocaleros were often out in the open collecting or drying
their leaves. Driving down the roads, you could see the catos dotted along all the main roads of
the area. I met the  cocaleros Nicolas and Jose as they were drying their leaves. I met the two
coqueros in the Chapare,  one on the bus and the other in a restaurant.  After not replying to
inquiries,7 I  went  to  the  UMOPAR  headquarters  in  Chimore  directly  and  talked  with  the
narcopolicias around the base. I was given the name of the commander and told where it was by
a photographer for the New York Times who previously worked with them in 2012 (see Neuman,
2012).  I was on the base for about four hours over the course of two days, mostly just talking
with the various soldiers who were coming and going. In total I held unstructured interviews
with three of the soldiers. Luis gave me a tour of the barracks, whereas Eduardo and Alejandro I
talked to in the office near the main gate. As it is a sensitive topic, all names have been changed.
5  I would have liked to conduct interviews with the pichicateros or laborers, but was unable to locate any due to the
deviant nature of their profession. I would also have liked to conduct interviews with convicted traffickers arrested
in the Chapare but I did not have time to gain access to the prison system.
6  One of the teachers was a friend of a friend of a friend of someone I knew from before.
7  I was starting to realize that despite all institutions and most  campesinos  having an email address, replying to
them has not quite caught on yet.
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Methods
 Most  of  the  available  literature  on  the  effectiveness  of  supply-side substance  control
policies have been partial equilibrium economic evaluations (Mejia & Restrepo, 2008: 4), which
rarely look at the policies' effect on the local population, aside from their overall compliance
with the programs.8 This is incongruous even with the stated goal of supply reduction, as the
long-term effectiveness  of  control  relies  on  community compliance  (see  Ibanez,  2007).  The
primary focus of this project was on the efforts of civil society and local communities, which was
done using qualitative research on site in the Chapare. To supplement my primary research, I
used a statistical evaluation of cocaine supply and homicide rates in order to analyze the effects
of this policy change at the state and regional levels. Lastly, to grasp the thing-power of coca, I
analyzed the discourse of political documents, media releases and historical records related to the
icon.
Interviews
“There are three closely related terms,” says Sara Delamont (2007: 205), “ethnography,
fieldwork and participant observation which are part of a wider term, “qualitative research.” This
form of research, which included watching people, talking to people casually, and joining with
their activities, is perhaps the best form of study to analyze conflict transformation (Milne, 2010:
74). Without an ethnographic study, if this had purely been a qualitative or economic evaluation,
my outlook on the project would have been completely different, and I would not have been able
to show an accurate portrayal the non-statistical effects of the program. 
The main criticism of qualitative research is its atomistic quality and how it may not scale
on the global scheme of things (Bryman, 2008). As I am analyzing a policy change, it would
have been impossible to conduct an ethnographic study with all potential stakeholders. Instead I
had  to  focus  on  one  geographic  area,  and  two  cultural  groups  (the  narcopolicias and  the
8  There have been reports released by the Andean Information Network on the effectiveness of the cato program
program which focused on the human rights of the cocaleros. See: (Farthing & |, 2015; Ledebur & Youngers, 2013).
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campesinos).  Therefore I  am using  previously conducted research in the area to validate my
responses  (Bryman,  2008).  None of  the  data  I  analyzed was presented  without  checking its
validity with previous research. I used quotations from other studies, to ensure that my personal
reflexivity had little effect on the results. In order to paint an accurate picture of the situation, I
tried to vary the sources of my data and the research methods as greatly as possible (Golafshani,
2003).
The interviews were all done in an unstructured manner due to the environment. Because
of where the interviews took place, the research had an informal quality. This allowed me to gain
the trust of the interviewees. Each interviewee was also offered a handful of coca as a sign of
respect. All the proper precautions were taken to ensure that the interviewees gave their informed
consent to the research. With a gate keeping organization to help with arranging interviews, they
could have been conducted more structured and in a formal setting. As it was, the only way to get
in contact with military personnel was to go to the base uninvited. Similarly, to get in contact
with cocaleros it was necessary to ask them directly as they dried their crop. 
I of course offered coca to all my interviewees as it was a great because of its culturally
binding properties, to “decline an offer to share coca would be to reject an invitation to be social”
(Grisaffi, 2010: 430). I could noticeably see people open up after I offered them a handful of
coca. The field research stage was conducted over a six-week period in July and August 2014. As
the research occurred two months before a major presidential election, it was not surprising that
many of the organizations supporting the president’s reelection were skeptical when dealing with
a researcher from a country that they allege is funding the opposition (see: page 40).
Statistics
The nature of this study makes it difficult to attribute causality to the implementation  of
the policy change (Garcia-Yi, 2014). Although the policies are generally favorable amongst the
population most affected by them, it is important to look at crime and development data made
available by the government and international organizations to understand the situation better
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(Bryman, 2007). An accurate assessment of the total cocaine paste exported from the region and
from Bolivia  is  important  to  take  into  consideration  when assessing  these  policies  from the
hegemonic perspective. To minimize bias and assure coherence, the statistics used in the analysis
were all obtained from the most available year from the United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime (UNODC), which are primarily from the 2014 fiscal year.
Discourse Analysis
The  interaction  of  the  thing-power  of  coca  and  society  is  best  understood  using  a
technique known as discourse analysis, which I employ in both the genealogy (Chapter 02) and
analysis (Chapter 05) to unearth the relations of power embedded in the language of political,
media, and historical discourse (Machin & Mayr, 2012: 2). Discourse “constitutes our social
world and the structures that define it. It also constitutes the natural world by providing us with
concepts that structure that world” (Hekman, 2010: 1).
According to linguist  Norman Fairclough (1989: 4), “the more practical objective [of
discourse analysis] is to help increase consciousness of language and power, and particularly of
how  language  contributes  to  the  domination  of  some  people  by  others.”  This  language
"manufactures the consent” of the multitude, justifying the further exercise of power in the form
of violence (Fairclough, 1989: 3-4). However not all discourse is coercion, as it  can also be
employed by social movements to ignite social change (ibid, 1992: 10). This project will look at
both the ideology of the War on Drugs and the ideology of the cato. Discourse analysis will be
used as the tertiary research objective of this project, mainly to supplement the primary and
secondary research methods, and to construct a base of which they can build off of.
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Reflections
The unique nature of this research presented a number of challenges unique to the study
area. The following section will identify four of these challenges and reflect on their possible
effect on the qualitative data collected. Reflexivity, language, and safety.
Reflexivity
On my first day in Cochabamba I went to the back of the massive central market known
as La Concha to purchase some coca and meet its vendors. For 20 Bolivianos, or less than $3, I
received a pound of coca,9 a grocery bag of small dried green leaves, of which half ultimately
lasted me throughout my fieldwork.
Over the next six weeks I was able to learn many of the nuances of the coca ritual. The
fifteen year old boy working at at the guesthouse I was staying at helped me refine my technique.
While in Spanish one would 'masticar' la hoja de coca, to masticate or to chew, in reality it's
more of a light suck. After a while I noticed my cheeks were sore, sensitive area poked at by the
tiny stems.  “Take the  stems out  one by one  with your  hands.”  Fold,  rip,  put  the  lamina in
between the cheek pouch and my jaw and repeat. Later one of my informants showed me a faster
way to rip the stems out with my teeth. The leaf is always consumed with a small amount of
bicarbonate ash, or  leija, which comes in a variety of flavors; some sweet, some savory, some
much tastier than others. When conducting ethnographic research we must use all our senses,
smell,  sight,  hearing,  touch and, yes even taste (Delamont,  2007).  As I write this now I am
sipping on a cup of coffee, while I was writing in Bolivia, I was 'chewing' on coca or drinking
mate de coca (coca tea) with none of the tremors,  headaches,  sleep deprivation,  or frequent
urination associated with prolonged coffee use (Spedding, 2004).10
9  This pound (454 grams), would have contained less than four grams of cocaine.
10  These negative effects could be why coffee abuse is not common. If you take even a little too much, it is very
unpleasant.
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Throughout  the  data  collection  process  I  have  had  to  be  consistently  aware  of  my
positionality  in  relation  to  the  local  community  where  I  was  conducting  my research.  My
relationship to the subjects may have had a noticeable effect on the quality or amount of data
collected (Eaves & Kahn, 2000). As a young adult white male from the United States, I had a
much more comfortable relationship with the narcopolicias than I had with the much older and
more apprehensive campesinos.
Working with indigenous communities in Bolivia provides a set of challenges that are
perhaps unique to this area. I had to constantly be aware of my cultural sensitivity. Prior to my
fieldwork I read extensively in order to gain an understanding of the “social, familial, cultural,
religious, historical and political” aspects of Quechua culture (Liamputtong, 2008: 24). As I have
previously spent time in a dozen South or Central American states, I understood the broader
aspects of post-colonial Latin America. The indigenous community in the Chapare is at the same
time both strong supporters of the current regime and increasingly independent (Canessa, 2007).
One major challenge was their concept of communal justice, which they would often impose
over the state run criminal justice system (see Hammond, 2011).
I was clearly an outsider in a very different cultural setting. Although outsider research
can offer benefits to the research such as analytical objectivity and emotional distance (Bryman,
2008), it also may construct a substantial barrier in the actual data collection process itself. Being
specifically  from a  country  such  as  the  United  States,  which  is  barraged  daily in  Bolivian
political rhetoric as a neoliberal imperialist, may have had a negative effect on my results. Insider
research may have produced more honest answers from subjects without an agenda, and without
fear of prosecution. In this case, being an outsider was a hurdle that proved to be difficult to
overcome within a limited amount of time. 
As most of the research concerning coca and its regulation has come from the perspective
of Western and Spanish-descendant researchers, it  is important not to reflect this  bias in the
research itself (Smith, 1999). In order to do this I must look at the coca leaf from the perspective
of an indigenous Bolivian,  and why eradication programs led to so much violence and civil
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unrest. Most of all, it is important to understand that to the Bolivian population, in the words of
President Morales speaking at the UN General Assembly, “coca is not cocaine.”
I undertook this project with a firm perspective on the immorality of the prohibitionist
policies of the  War on Drugs. As such I have had to be reflectively aware of my own moral
positions and assumptions throughout the research (Zigon, 2010: 3). According to Stoczkowski
(2008: 348–9), the researcher has the commitment “to defend the rights of the oppressed… to
testify, to defend, to take care of, to lavish the benefits of its science and of its action on those in
need.”11 Where according to indigenous researcher Linda Tuhiwai Smith (199: 116), the purpose
of research is itself to work towards “self-determination for indigenous peoples,” of which the
research  “involves  the  processes  of  transformation,  of  decolonization,  of  healing  and  of
mobilization.” Was this project to be an unbiased policy evaluation or an ethnography of the
indigenous struggle for self-determination? 
Language
Language  is  one  of  the  more  important  dynamics  when  considering  the  vitality  of
ethnographic research. Although language is always an important tool to keep in mind when
conducting cross-cultural fieldwork, the unique linguistic dynamics of this particular area make
it  especially  interesting  (Hennink,  2008).  The primary indigenous  languages  in  the  Chapare
region are Quechua and Aymara, the pre-Colombian indigenous languages of the Incan Empire.12
Language in Bolivia serves as a major part of the speaker's identity. Although widely understood,
Spanish does not serve as the main conversational language of many of the  campesinos in the
area. All three languages are taught to children at local school, and almost all of the campesinos
can at  least  partially understand all  three.  Alternatively,  as the police and military personnel
stationed in the region were not from the Chapare, Spanish serves as their primary language of
communication.
11  As quoted in Zigon 2010.
12 Quechua is the more common language, whereas Aymaras were the later wave of immigrants from the highlands,
which included Evo Morales.
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It's important to understand the relationship between language and the cultural identity in
the  area.  Spanish  is  the language of  the colonizers  in  most  of  Latin  America,  and the  only
language spoken by the majority of the population. Evo Morales' public speeches are almost all
done in Spanish (Howard, 2010: 180-181).13 Due to the high linguistic variability amongst the
indigenous peoples in Bolivia, it also serves as the  lingua franca  for all of Bolivia. Although
Quechua is the most widely spoken indigenous language in the Chapare, a large migration of
Aymara speaking coca farmers occurred in the second half of the twentieth century after the mass
closing  of  mineral  mines  in  the  Altiplano took away their  livelihoods.  To an  outsider,  it  is
difficult to distinguish between the various indigenous languages spoken in the area.
All of the interviews were thus conducted in Spanish.14 A translator was not used when
conducting the  research,  either  from Quechua to  Spanish or  Quechua to  English.  To ensure
credibility,  my questions  were checked for  grammatical  accuracy before the interviews by a
native speaker, although my mistakes in speech may have been disarming. A translator would
have made the interviews more fluid and robust, but I was unable to locate one. Unsurprisingly
there are very few residents in the Chapare who could speak English.15 Many of the subjects
appeared wary or apprehensive when the interviews started, as the language barrier may have
furthered cultural differences.16
Safety
The ongoing conflict in Latin America regarding the trafficking of drugs is perhaps the
longest running and most violent conflict in the world (UNODC, 2013: 32). Due to the nature of
the conflict and the lack of political will of the combatants, there are very few considerations
13  There is apparently doubt as to whether or not he can speak Aymara or Quechua fluently (Canessa, 2007: 199),
although  Morales  biographer  believes  he  uses  Spanish  because  it  allows  him  to  centralizar (centralize)
communcation, meaning to have a broader reach (Howard, 2010 181).
14  I learned basic-level Spanish by living in Colombia for six months between 2010 and 2012.
15 In a month conducting research in the area, I did not meet anyone able to speak English, despite it being taught in
schools from a young age (Interview – campesino Willis). 
16 I learned some basic Quechua phrases, so while I didn't know which people they came from, Willis said most
people could at least understand both.
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taken for journalists and researchers investigating the nature of the conflict. Asking the wrong
question to the wrong person, or witnessing something I should not have could have had dire
consequences.17
Although not as violent as many of the countries along the trafficking route,18 Bolivia still
encounters many of the same problems as its northern neighbors regarding the illicit substance
market. In the larger cities of Santa Cruz, El Alto, and Cochabamba homicide related to the illicit
market can be considered commonplace, and violence in the rural areas is not unheard of. To
ensure my safety certain precautions were taken. First,  knowledge acquisition allowed me to
reformulate questions based on what was considered culturally acceptable and how to keep the
interviewees protected from prosecution. The culture in the Chapare is very different from my
home country of the United States and is subject to its own indigenous judiciary system. Second
by making myself known to local law enforcement, I was advised on how to continue with the
research. Throughout the research, the questions were continuously updated as to appease the
interviewees and certain precautions were taken regarding taking electronic equipment into the
field, mostly out of respect. I did not contact the narcopolicias until the end of the study to avoid
a potential conflict of interest.
Other precautions were taken to ensure the safety and confidentiality of the informants
and  organizations.  The  data  collected  and  any personal  identifiers  were  kept  on  a  recently
formatted password-protected laptop running an updated version of the Debian operating system
with an encrypted hard drive. Encryption is a way of encoding the data that makes it virtually
impossible  for  even  the  most  technically  advanced  governments  to  gain  access  without  the
encryption code. In field, a paper notebook was used to record the data, which was transferred to
a document on the computer at the end of each day. The paper was then destroyed. Requests for
files were made by UMOPAR about the nature of the project but not about the data itself. After
17 I am reminded of a story one of my students told me in Colombia. A couple they knew were walking along the
beach and accidentally stumbled upon a boat being loaded with cocaine, so the traffickers shot them dead.
18 The relative safety of Bolivia compared to Colombia (of which I was much more familiar with) was in part the
reason why I chose to do my fieldwork there.
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checking the files for mistaken identifiers, I presented them my research proposal. They did not
seem too concerned with the information collected, but rather made the request to assist with the
research. The soldiers appeared to know exactly where the cocaine production was taking place
and knew the process of extraction and product export as well as the traffickers, but could not
keep up with production. 
This chapter outlined the methodology used in my research, as well as identifying three
concerns I had to be aware of during my fieldwork. The following chapter will outline a theory
to analyze the data collected. 
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04 Theory
“Where they make a desert, they call it peace.” - Tacitus
Winning the War on Drugs on the terms of the United Nations' conventions would mean,
according  to sociologist Allison Spedding (1997), “eradicating the entire Andean population.”1
As complete eradication is neither possible nor preferred, this chapter will outline a framework
that takes into account the human rights of the local, state and global actors affected by the
policy  change.  I  will  structure  this  chapter  using  an  expanded  version  of  Galtung's  (1996)
tripartite conception of violence. To analyze the concept of cultural violence, this chapter will
explore the concept of deviance and the effects of these labels on the population. To analyze the
concepts of structural violence (economic misery and oppression), it will outline the definitions
of human and indigenous rights within the UN system, and how War on Drugs does not respect
these  conventions.  It  will  then  look  at  the  cultural,  structural  and  direct  forms  of  violence
associated  with  environmental  destruction.  For  direct  violence,  this  chapter  will  look  at  the
potential motivations of civil unrest, and the systemic violence inherent in illicit markets. Finally,
the chapter will conclude with a look at why the effects of any international supply fluctuation
will most likely be few and difficult to measure.
1 Matienzo’s sixteenth century (1560) observation: "To do away with coca is like denying the existence of Peru."
The rhetoric used in the conflicting ideologies have not changed in almost 500 years.
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Violence
Peace, in the sense of absence of war, is of little value to someone who is dying of hunger or cold. It will
not remove the pain of torture inflicted on a prisoner of conscience ... peace can only last where human
rights are respected, where the people are fed, and where individuals and nations are free. - Dalai Lama
1989
Using the minimalist conception of peace, a peaceful solution would be attained when
there  would  be  no  more  direct  or  personal  violence  between  actors  (Bufacchi,  2005:  195).
However this peace, labeled as 'negative peace' by Galtung (1969), does not address the often
more destructive and pervasive forms of harm endemic to the human condition. In order for a
lasting 'positive' peace to occur, survival, economic well-being, freedom and community needs
must all be met (Fischer, 2007: 188). Furthermore, a truly comprehensive conception of peace
takes into account the environment, which can be explored both at the nexus of the other four
types, and as it's own category against an actant with inherent value (Galtung, 1996: 129; Latour,
1999).
According  to  Raymond  Williams  (1976:  329)  the  concept  of  violence  in  popular
discourse “seems to be specialized to ‘unauthorized’ uses,” the violence of the narco-trafficker,
rather than the narcopolicias, which instead use force (see Macfarlane, 1974). This may be the
case in popular discourse, but for the purpose of analytics, all violence will be weighed equally.
Max Weber  made the  distinction  that  although the  state  holds  a  monopoly over  legitimized
violence, it is nonetheless still conceived as violence and reacted upon as such (Bufacchi, 2005:
193). Whether or not these violations are a necessary consequence to reach the goal of a “drug-
free world” (UNDCP, 1998) the definition of violence remains unchanged.  The comprehensive
conception of violence allows us to assess the destructive and pervasive forms of harm; further
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broken  down  into  exclusion,  oppression,  economic  misery,  environmental  destruction  and
resistance.2 
Exclusion
“Culture is one of the two or three most complicated words in the English language,”
Williams (1976: 87) begins the entry on “culture” in  Keywords.3 Defined in the words of E.B.
Tylor (1871), as "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom
and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society," the concept of
culture engulfs our entire symbolic sphere of existence,4 or the mythologies and fictions5 we have
collectively  built  our  society  on.  Internalized  as  facts,  these  myths  often  have  harmful
consequences. These harms are what Galtung (1990) calls  cultural violence, the way in which
culture  legitimizes  and thus  renders  acceptable  the  act  of  personal  violence  and the  fact  of
structural violence.
Belongingness is an often overlooked need when analyzing violence, yet it has stayed as
a common theme in literature, theater and film (Maslow 1954, 43-45). Exclusion is a feeling we
have all experienced and can relate to, yet the criminal is often portrayed as being deserving of
their  ostracism,  because  they  have  done  something  we  define  as  bad.  Durkheim's  (1895)
conception of crime is that criminal behavior is not only harmless to the integrity of society, but
rather it is necessary for a society to function. In Hardt and Negri's (2000: 37) deterritorialized
Empire,  the  narcotic traffickers and  terrorists serve  the  purpose  of  international  deviants,
justifying the global exercise of police power and imperial sovereignty (ibid: 38). 
In her analysis of officially released United Nations discourse, Eva Herschinger (2012:
80-81) observed:
2 Structural violence (Galtung, 1969); cultural violence (Galtung, 1990); environmental violence (Galtung, 1996:
129). Structural violence will be further broken down into economic misery and political oppression (Galtung, 1996:
20; Fischer, 2007: 187).
3 As cited in Brown, 2006
4 Galtung, 1990: 291
5 Mythologies and fictions as used by Barthes, 1957 and Harari, 2014 respectively.
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...one discerns constant attempts to dichotomise the discursive space and create enemies. ‘Drugs had become
a  scourge  of  humanity’ and  are  posing a  serious  threat  to  ‘the  political  and  economic  stability of  the
international community as a whole’. Since drugs and drug trafficking are endangering civilisation through a
‘drug holocaust’, ‘everything must be done ... against the evils of drugs’, and ‘humanity’s war on drugs’ is
essential to survive. Building from the outset on the seldom questioned illegality of drugs, the international
discourse  on  drug  prohibition  is  full  of  such  articulations,  which  constitute  drugs,  the  internationally
organised drug dealers or the individual dealer as antagonistic Other. The dealers are ‘notorious smugglers’
who should be subjected to ‘severe penalties’, and the international drug ‘barons’ – the ‘kingpins of the
international traffic’ – are ‘sophisticated gangsters who operated the drugs traffic’, paying ‘no attention to
country, religion or flag’.
According to the  1961 Convention on Narcotic Drugs, coca is part of this  scourge. To
understand the violence of this discourse we must understand its integration with the Bolivian
identity. A 1993 'manifesto' released by Morales'  Council for the Defence of Coca Producers
pleaded to the international community over the indigenous rights of the Chapare cocaleros:
‘The eradication of  the coca leaf would be,  for our Andean people,  the death.  Because for us coca is
everything: Our material survival, our myths, our cosmovision of the world, the happiness to live, the word
of our ancestors, the constant dialog with the Pachamama, our reason to be in this world. In sum, the fight
for the revaluation and defence of the coca leaf synthesises all of these demands that today give meaning to
our lives and without which there will be no future. It is the symbol and the representation of our identity’
(CAPC 1993 as quoted in Grisaffi, 2010: 15).
By  defining  a  long  held  cultural  tradition  as  a  crime  without  representation  or
consultation,  the  implementation  of  the  convention  has  justified  over  a  half  century  of
“institutionalized, repetitive, and ritualistic” violence against the Andean people (Galtung, 1996:
208). The classification of a cultural activity as deviance depends upon the superior power of the
designators, as prohibition is a cultural system of norms and interdicts no matter how natural or
universal  it  may  seem  (Derrida,  1967:  4). Deviance,  as  Thrasymachus  defines  Justice  for
Socrates,  has  always  lied  in  the  'will  of  the  stronger'  (Gusfield,  1967:  231).  These  labels
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according to sociologist Joseph Gusfield (1967: 231), “...become an issue of political conflict,
ranging group against group and culture against culture, in the effort to determine whose morals
are to be designated as deserving of public affirmation.” Deviance is thus not a quality of a bad
person  making  them  deserving of  state  violence,  but  rather  simply  the  consequence  of  this
designation (Becker, 1963).6
As the sociological theory of deviance is well developed, it becomes easier to analyze the
effects of these labels on the population. These effects can be seen at the local, state, and global
levels, on both human and non-human actants. On the global level, coca is labeled as a Schedule
I narcotic, and all growers, suppliers and consumers of the leaf are labeled as criminals (Bewley-
Taylor,  2012:  261).  Conversely,  in  the  local  community  in  the  Chapare,  coca  growing  has
historically been seen as a respectable profession,  and any state  or international intervention
against growers or suppliers is met with resistance itself.
The  social  exclusion  faced  during  eradication  programs  has  been  linked  to  to  what
Lemert  (1951:  75)  has  labeled  'secondary  deviance'  (Ibanez,  2007:  166).  The  stigmatized
cocalero is forced to engage in the often violent illicit market, increasing his psychological stress
and decreasing  his  trust  in  institutions  (Goffman,  1963:  151).  This  may cause  more  violent
behavior from the stigmatized campesino, including violence against the state.
Misery
“We must (...) ensure that the sustainable development pillar contains elements combating illicit drugs and
crime,  while  also  ensuring  that  drug  control  and  anti-crime  strategies  are  sensitive  to  the  needs  of
development.” United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon
6 “Note that  the terms deviant  (in  cases  of  individuals)  and deviance  (in  cases  of  behavior)  are  sociologically
defined as involving the violation of significant social norms held by conventional society. The terms are not used in
a judgmental manner, nor are the individuals judged to be immoral or “sick;” instead, the terms refer to an absence
of the patterns of behavior expected by conventional society” (Drugs and Society, 2008).
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The evidence shows that there is a clear link between narcotic production and the poor
social  conditions  that  further  undermine  development  efforts  (Hynes  &  Alimi,  2014:  3).
However, the link appears to be associated with their status of illegality rather than the qualities
of the commodities being produced (Miron, 2004).7 Interdiction leads to “increased violence and
urban destabilization; a growing prison population overwhelmed with street dealers and addicts;
the escalation of human rights violations resulting from an over-militarization of the fight and/or
inadequate criminal justice provisions; and increasing levels of poverty among farmers whose
fields have been destroyed” (Hynes & Alimi, 2014: 4).
In an effort  to promote cohesion within the UN bodies,  the UN Development Group
adopted a declaration in 2003 to assure that all agencies would apply a consistent Human Rights-
Based Approach to common programming processes at global and regional levels. The Statement
of Common Understanding on Human Rights-Based Approaches to Development Cooperation
and Programming affirmed that all programs of development, policies and technical assistance
should further the realization of human rights as laid down in the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and other international human rights instruments. Furthermore, the UN General
Assembly adopted a resolution which states that “countering the world drug problem” must be
carried out in full  conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations and international law, “in particular” with human rights (Barrett & Nowak, 2009). The
human rights-based approach means “empowering marginalized groups, challenging oppression
and exclusion, and changing power relations" (Uvin, 2007: 604).
Conversely, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the UN agency in charge of
implementing and overseeing the conventions, views illicit commodities as mainly relating to
law and order and security. Despite being part of the UN system, the body rarely looks at the
implications of socioeconomic development or environmental destruction (Crofts, 2011; Barrett,
2010). However, according to Eide (1999) disallowing the  socioeconomic development of the
world's poorest is as clear of a violation of human rights as “executing political opponents.” 
7 While psychotropic substances are often associated with poverty, their use can said to be more of a symptom than
a cause.
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Although there  has  been question as  to  whether  using the term “human rights” with
regards to illicit commodities will be politically efficacious (Keane, 2003), there has nevertheless
been a growing human rights movement  focused on minimizing harm. In response to the high
human costs associated with a strict prohibitionist policy, some countries have enacted public
health policies that have shown to respect the rights of the consumers, while reducing the harm
of their use. These demand-side policies have not shown to lead to an increase in drug abuse or
drug demand (Ritter & Cameron, 2006) .
Supply-side harm reduction programs have not  yet  caught  on globally.  In hegemonic
discourse, the people in the production countries would be what Chomsky & Herman (1988: 47)
call  the 'unworthy'  victims of the  War on Drugs whereas assuaging the harms to local  drug
abusers (worthy) can been seen as much more politically efficacious.8 Licensing programs have
worked in the past at controlling the illicit opium market, but as there is no prescription demand
for coca products, supply-side harm reduction goes against the prohibitionist ideology (Felbab-
Brown, 2007).
These strict  eradication programs leave  cocaleros with few alternatives.  Even though
coca cultivation is illegal throughout the majority of the region and punishable by harsh fines,
imprisonment and crop eradication,  cocaleros are nonetheless continuing to cultivate, as there
are limited options available to farmers in these regions (Ibanez, 2007). By providing no viable
alternative,  this  policies  prevent  farmers  from  earning  a  much  needed  livelihood  for  their
families. Left with no alternative, ignoring the severe threat of state intervention and continuing
cultivation becomes the rational choice for the campesinos (Chomsky, 2000: 77).
There have been attempts in the past to mitigate the indirect human costs inherent with
eradication  programs.  Known as  'alternative  development,'  these  programs  would  allow the
cocaleros a stipend or loan with the stipulation they would abandon all cultivation of coca and
instead plant alternative crops on their land. However, according to Lesley Gill, they "were less
about alleviating poverty than coercing [the cocaleros] to forsake their only viable cash crop.”
8 It probably is not a coincidence that the switch to softer, more public health focused policies coincides with an
increase in heroin-related deaths amongst the (predominately white) rich and middle class (see Seelye, 2015).
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Without  proper  infrastructure  and an established international  market,  alternative  crops  have
been met with mixed results (Dangl, 2007: 48). 
The problem may be more related to  the improper  implementation of  the  alternative
development programs rather than the premise of the programs itself. A review of the research
done in Colombia has shown alternative development programs to be effective in reducing the
area of land cultivated with coca (Ibanez, 2014).9 Conversely, eradication programs done in the
same area either increased coca supply or had no significant effect (ibid).  According to Vanda
Felbab-Brown (2014) eradication programs seem to only bankrupt the campesinos, as "there is
not  one  single  case  over  the  past  five  decades  where  eradication  policies  succeeded  in
bankrupting or defeating belligerents." While it is difficult to know the full economic impact,
Kohl and Farthing write that the strict eradication programs of Plan Dignidad cost the economy
of Cochabamba between $150 and $500 million per year (Kohl and Farthing, 2006: 158). As
Nick Crofts (2011) says, "this is a vicious cycle – poor development fuels conflict, which fuels
the coca trade, which fuels conflict, which fuel poverty.”
Oppression
Walking around the cities of El Alto and Cochabamba one can clearly see the symbols of
indigenous nationalism and hear the indigenous languages, which Mark Goodale (2006) refers to
as  “indigenous  cosmopolitanism.”  Although  the  term  indio  in  Bolivia  is  considered  to  be
derogatory,10 the concept of  indigeneity is of considerable importance to the identity of many
Bolivians.  For  most  of  its  postcolonial  history,  Bolivia  pursued nation-building  policies  that
sought to eliminate or make invisible ethnic distinctions (Van & Lee, 2000: 207). Still today, the
Bolivian census of 2001 records 66% of the population as identifying as  indigenous, which is
one of the highest percentages in the world (Canessa, 2007: 152).
9 See Ibanez, 2014).
10 “The 1952 revolution abolished the term “indio” as it attempted to do away with the hacienda owning class, and
abolished the many semi-feudal practices which sustained them… The term indio was replaced with campesino.”
(Canessa, 2007)
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In 1972, José Martínez-Cobo from the  United Nations Working Group on Indigenous
Populations (WGIP) gave this working definition of indigenous peoples:
“Indigenous communities, peoples, and nations are those that, having a historical continuity with pre-
invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct
from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at
present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop, and transmit to
future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued
existence as  peoples,  in accordance with their  own cultural  patterns,  social  institutions and legal
systems.” 
The UN thus uses the concept of indigeneity defined primarily as a relationship between
the  colonized  and  colonizers,  or  as  Wilmer  (1993)  put  it  “indigenous  peoples  represent  the
unfinished business of decolonization.” The term indigenous itself is not an accurate analytical
one,  but rather one drawing on broad family resemblances and contemporary political  issues
(Eriksen, 2010: 18), it exists for the purpose of self-determination (Smith, 1999: 116).
Without consultation this broad definition failed to include all ethnic groups in Bolivia. In
mid-1988, the  Ley 1008, Ley del Regimen de la Coca y Substancias Controladas outlawed all
coca cultivation outside of the Yungas region. The law also established legal, transitional and
illegal zones of cultivation and declared that 12,000 hectares of coca would be the amount grown
to meet the traditional demand for coca (DEA, 1993). Under this law, which allowed limited
traditional  coca  cultivation  in  the  Yungas,  cocaleros in  the  Chapare  were  unable  to  claim
indigeneity due to their status as a displaced population from the highlands (Grisaffi, 2010: 425).
However under international law, despite their geographic location, the uprooted communities
are nevertheless recognized as indigenous peoples and thus qualify under international law as
having the right to self-determination (Smith, 1999: 7).
In 2007, Bolivia became the first state to ratify the The UN Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) which guarantees that:
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Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their cultural heritage, traditional
knowledge, and traditional cultural expressions, as well as the manifestations of their sciences, technologies
and cultures, including human and genetic resources, seeds, medicines and knowledge of the properties of
fauna and flora (Article 31).
In part modeled after the UNDRIP, the 2009 Bolivian constitution further protects the
rights of coca:
The State protects the native and ancestral coca as cultural patrimony, as a renewable natural resource of the
biodiversity of  Bolivia,  and  as  a  factor  of  social  unity.  In  its  natural  state  coca  is  not  a  narcotic.  The
revaluation, production, sale and industrialization of coca shall be governed by law. Chapter VII, Section II,
Article 384.
The government subsequently made a formal request to have coca removed from the
1961 convention. The submission argued that the convention’s “restrictions on and prohibition of
coca leaf chewing” violate the UNDRIP (ECOSOC, 2009: 5). The request, which is still under
review, led to Bolivia leaving and subsequently rejoining the convention in 2013.
Environmental Destruction
From the culture perspective of the West, by being solely concerned with homo-centric
economic development, what Mignolo (2009: 10) calls 'the rhetoric of modernity' has justified
the  destruction  of  non-human  nature11 at  a  resounding  rate.  What  Weber  conceptualized
“modernity,” as being the direction of history that had Europe as a model and a goal (Mignolo,
2009: 4), has led to climate change, a mass extinction event, and a unprecedented destruction of
the world's ecosystems (Kolbert, 2014). This perspective has led to the UN bodies in charge of
cocaine interdiction feigning little concern over any environmental damage caused by their War
11 Galtung (1996:  129)  makes  this  distinction  to  remind us  that  humanity is  not  inherently separate  from our
environment.
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on Drugs.  Differing greatly from the indigenous conception of the Bolivian population,  this
dichotomy has led to further oppression through the destruction of the sacred.
In contrast to the hegemonic conception, Mother Earth, or Pachamama is held as a sacred
icon in the worldview of the Indigenous peoples of Bolivia. The Bolivian Ley de Derechos de la
Madre Tierra defines Mother Earth as "...the dynamic living system formed by the indivisible
community of  all  life  systems and living  beings  whom are  interrelated,  interdependent,  and
complementary,  which  share  a  common  destiny.”  Through  this  law  humans  and  their
communities are considered a part of Mother Earth, by being integrated in 'life systems.' The law
gives nature legal rights,  specifically the “rights to life and regeneration,  biodiversity,  water,
clean air, balance, and restoration” (Buxton, 2011). While vague and not always adhered to,12 the
law demonstrates the high importance of nature in the culture of the Bolivian people.13
Evo Morales has been a staunch defender of the environment in his political discourse: “a
colonial state which permitted the permanent sacking of natural resources from this noble earth,
a  colonial  disciplining  state”  (Canessa,  2014:  14).  Morales'  rhetoric  of  anti-colonialism and
environmentalism is in line with Hardt and Negri's (2009: 171) concept of the cohesiveness of
altermodern movements, that they are working towards an “ecology of the common... an ecology
focussed equally on nature and society, on humans and the nonhuman world in a dynamic of
interdependence, care, and mutual transformation.” 
Environmental  violence  associated  with  illicit  coca  is  caused  locally  by  three
mechanisms: deforestation by cocaleros, chemical run-off from liquid effluents by pichicateros,
and aerial fumigation by narcopolicias. Deforestation and chemical run-off can occur with both
eradication  and alternative  programs,  while  fumigation  will  only occur  under  an  eradication
policy. 
As coca is grown in isolated areas it expands the agricultural frontier and contributes to
significant deforestation (Grisaffi & Ledebur, 2014: 5). For example it is calculated that in Peru,
12 For instance Bolivia's controversial TIPNIS highway plan  (Canessa, 2007)
13 The Bolivian constitution also refers to the environment as an actant with inherent value.
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2.5 million hectares of forest have been destroyed as a result of coca cultivation (Briones et al.,
2013: 33). As coca's economic output per acre is high (Hellin, 2001), coca related deforestation
has instead been linked to market instability14 (Bradley & Millington, 2008: 31). As interdiction
efforts increase, cocaleros move deeper into untouched forest. As new markets and commodity
chains open up, economic migrants move in from other areas. 
The three main herbicides used in fumigation of coca are glyphosate, tebuthiuron, and
hexazinone (ECOSOC 1989: 4), where the former being the most prevalent. Collecting data on
health  complaints  in  areas  where  fumigation  occurs  is  difficult  as  causality  is  very hard  to
determine. However, local health workers in Colombia often report increased skin, respiratory
and  gastrointestinal  problems  following  aerial  spraying.  Generate  health  problems  in  rural
populations  exposed  to  the  herbicides  used  in  these  campaigns  (Camacho  & Mejia,  2014).
Following a 2015 report showing the glyphosate may cause cancer (Fritschi, 2015), Colombia
became the last Andean country to cease all aerial fumigation. While the scientific evidence is
not yet definitive, the widespread perception among Andeans is that fumigation jeopardizes the
region’s water sources and rich biodiversity.
Anthropologist Maria Clemencia Ramirez (2011) studied how people who live in spray
zones suffer from a variety of ailments in Colombia. She recorded health problems of the skin,
respiratory and gastrointestinal problems. They also complain that spraying is indiscriminate and
carried  out  without  warning,  and  have  affected  food  and  cash  crops,  which  in  turn  has
undermined food security. In Peru and Colombia campesinos have held national level protests to
campaign against coca eradication and in both countries armed actors (Sendero Luminoso and the
FARC, respectively) have sided with the  cocaleros to resist eradication, further strengthening
their support in the regions (Felbab-Brown, 2009).
The final  form of  damage,  that  caused by liquid  effluents  used  in  the  production  of
cocaine,  is  difficult  to measure because of their  variability in use (Alvarez,  2003: 135). The
chemicals change based on what is available, and depending on the experience of the chemist
14 As is true with systemic violence, see below.
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running the lab. Many of these chemicals used in the riverside production of cocaine such as
gasoline, paraquat, sulfuric acid, are categorized as more harmful ecosystem contaminants than
the aerial herbicides discussed below (Pereira, 2010: 396).
Resistance
A Human Rights Watch report on the Bolivian abuses of the War on Drugs from 1995 states: 
“In  the  Chapare,  the  rural  area  in  which  most  of  Bolivia's  coca  is  grown  and  cocaine  base
produced,  the anti-narcotics  police  run  roughshod  over  the  population,  barging  into  homes  in  the
middle  of  the  night, searching people and possessions at will, manhandling and even beating residents,
stealing their goods and money.  Arbitrary arrests and detentions are routine.” 
This report was released two years prior to the election of Banzer and the shift towards
the  even  more  aggressive  approach  to  eradication, Plan  Dignidad. The  report  documents
systematic torture and abuse alleging that “US officials dismiss or downplay abuses by the US
supported Bolivian counternarcotics forces” and that “Bolivian and US public officials make
excuses for or attempt to justify human rights violations in the context of the drug war” (Human
Rights Watch, 1995). Furthermore, the New York Times report that according to a government
source, during  Plan Dignidad 60 people were killed and more than 700 were wounded in the
Chapare in violence related to eradication (Neuman, 2012).
This  interaction  between  violation  of  identity  and  [direct]  violence  is,  according  to
Williams (1974: 330), “obvious.”  The classic causal chain proposed by Ted Robert Gurr (1970:
12-13)  is  as  follows:  “first  the  development  of  discontent,  second  the  politicization  of  that
discontent, and finally its actualization in violent action against political objects and actors.” 
However, according to a study done by Collier and Hoeffler (1998) civil unrest appears to
be more common in the presence of a perceived economic gain, and this political discontent
appears to be more of a narrative than a motivational cause. Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2002)
find that states with a heavy reliance on the export of primary commodities (PCE) face a higher
53
risk of civil war because PCEs are the perceived rewards for a successful rebellion. Fearon and
Laitin refute this claim using unique datasets, finding that only oil, gemstones and narcotics can
be seen as an effective motivator for civil war (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Fearon, 2004). 
Eradication  has  been  shown  to  increase  resentment  of  the  government  and  law
enforcement agencies in these areas. In Colombia, this has led to increased support for guerrilla
organizations in these communities, as they were the only actors offering a means to meet their
basic  needs.  Often  a  number  attributed  only  to  the  ongoing  civil  conflict,  coca  eradication
programs in Colombia contribute significantly to the 4.7 million internally displaced people, by
destroying all crops in the targeted area and forcing the  cocaleros off their land to the cities
(Dion & Russler, 2008, pg. 399). On the conflict in Bolivia,  cocalero  activist  Leonilda Zurita
said: “this [was] not a war against narcotraficantes; it's a war against those who are working to
survive."
Cocaine
The late-modern era is popularly characterized as one of globalization, integration, and
economic  liberalization  leading  to  an  ever  increasingly  "borderless  world"  (Raustia,  2009).
Robert Reich, former U.S. secretary of labor, contends that ‘‘as almost every factor of production
—money, technology, factories, and equipment—moves effortlessly across borders, the very idea
of a [national] economy is becoming meaningless.’’ (Hardt & Negri, 2000: 150-151). This is
perhaps most apparent in the case of illicit markets, which are largely unencumbered by tariffs,
regulations, and state (as opposed to geographic) borders.
In this borderless world the consequences of any significant fluctuation in coca supply
have the potential  to  ripple through a dozen or  so transit  and consumer  countries,  affecting
various stakeholders along the way. This makes the economic consequences of a localized policy
change difficult to analyze on the global level. Further complicating the study is how cocaine
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supply in consumer countries has historically been balanced by geographic displacement. This
has  become  known  as  the  Balloon  Effect,15 where  “the  success  of  eradication  in  one  area
temporarily reduces the supply, and that translates into a price rise. Then, given that the supply
function is fairly elastic, higher prices stimulate people to plant crops in other places” (Cuartas et
al., 2003).  Between 1987 and 2008, the total coca acreage in the Andean region as a whole
remained stable  at  around 190,000 hectares  despite  a  constant  fluctuation between the three
countries (Youngers & Walsh, 2010: 3).
Taking this into account, this project will be done as a partial equilibrium analysis, as
there  will  be  no  expected  effect  on  the  global  market  (Mejia,  2008:  3).  A truly  successful
program at reducing supply would be seen in cocaine retail prices and purity measures, which is
a standard that has yet to be realized (Thoumi, 2005: 196).16 As the coca grown in the Chapare
makes  up  a  relatively small  percentage  of  the  global  market  of  cocaine,  the  economic  and
systemic effects of the cato program will likely only be seen at the local level.
According to researcher Jaqueline Garcia-Yi (2014: 74) social control requires the four
elements  of  Travis  Hirschi's  (1969:  16),  social  control  theory:  “attachment  to  families,
commitment to social norms and institutions, involvement in activities, and the belief that these
things  are  important.”  Social  control  theory  works  independently  of  economic  and  political
motivation, rather relying on changing the norms of the community. 
It is difficult to compare the rights of producers in supply countries to the costs associated
with the public health of substance abuse in the consumer countries.  In the current  political
climate, an unlimited supply of cocaine cannot be seen as a viable solution for any of the Andean
nations.  For the United States  to  act  unilaterally economist  Jonathan P.  Caulkins  (2014: 21)
estimates the costs of an end to prohibition would be far greater than the economic costs of the
15 When you squeeze a balloon the air distorts other parts of the balloon. There will still be the same amount of air
inside, but the place where the air is will change. 
16 The largest drivers of price and purity measures appear to be cultural. Cocaine use is a fad that goes in and out of
fashion. See: Spach, Wyart: 2014
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drug war.17 In his analysis of the costs and benefits of the Colombian equivalent of the  Plan
Dignidad labeled  Plan  Colombia,  Colombian  economist  Daniel  Mejia  (2014:  27)  refutes
Caulkins' partial equilibrium analysis because it ignores the major costs of prohibition accrued
globally. Mejia writes: “prohibitionist drug policies can be understood as a transfer of the costs
of the drugs problem faced by consumer countries to producer and transit countries.”
Systemic Violence
The vast majority of personal violence associated with the coca commodity chain is in the
form of what Paul Goldstein (1985: 5-6) calls systemic violence,18 or the violence inherent to the
illicit market themselves.  In this model, the type of good being transacted is not a relevant factor
in determining violence, but rather rests solely on its status of illegality (Mejia & Restrepo, 2011:
2).  As compensation for  the  controls  of  a  licit  market,  systemic violence can be seen  at  as
intraorganizational  (successional  and  disciplinary),  interorganizational  (territorial  or
transactional), and between the organization and state or community interdiction (Reuter, 2009:
275).
Illegality cannot alone explain why some illicit markets have shown immense levels of
personal  violence  while  others  have  been  relatively  benign  (Brownstein  et  al.,  2000:  868).
Although inconclusive, an analysis of trends has shown a correlation between systemic violence
and market instability; when an outside variable causes a market fluctuation, violence will be
present as the market balances itself (Brownstein  et al.,  2000: 868). This effect has been most
notably seen with the introduction of crack cocaine to the United States in the late 1980s, and in
17 He calculates this based on the potential rise of drug use and potential costs of further drug abuse. Conversely,
according to Felix Guattari (2012): “a regime of free distribution would doubtless lead to a decrease in the volume
of drug use, due to the fact that it would lessen the intensity of the drug mythology, and lead to the disappearance of
its principal advocates.” Whether or not drug abuse will rise in a world without prohibition is outside the realm of
economic understanding.
18 The  other  two  mechanisms  identified  by  Goldstein,  the  psychopharmacological  and  the  economically
compulsive, involve the actions of the consumer.
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Mexico during the crackdown on the cartels in the mid 2000s (Reuter, 2009: 275). Miron (2001)
shows that this directly correlates with the intensity of law enforcement efforts.
Using the available data, systemic violence will be analyzed on the local and state levels.
As personal  violence  in  the Chapare  is  rare,  the causes  in  this  area  will  be  much easier  to
analyze. Cultural, political and economic motivations will be looked at in relation to each other
as  well  as  the  corresponding  response  from  the  state.  At  the  state  and  global  levels,
distinguishing between the types of organizational violence will be much more difficult and thus
will only be analyzed in relation to the fluctuations of supply.
Using the comprehensive conception of violence, this chapter presented a way in which a
coca control program can respect the rights of those who are involved in the commodity chain
without allowing an increase of cocaine on the global market. The following chapter will use this
framework to analyze Bolivia's cato program.
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05 Analysis
“Alegría imagined a map of the world suspended in darkness until
suddenly a tiny flame blazed up, followed by others, to form a burning
necklace of revolution across the two Americas.”
—Leslie Marmon Silko, Almanac of the Dead
The cato has brought the cocalero much more than its equivalent price in coca. Through
this program they were allowed to integrate into society,  free to cultivate their revered crop,
collaborate with the narcopolicias and develop their own community space.
Belonging
According to the director of the Community Control Support Program in Bolivia, Pedro
Ferrano, “the greatest benefit this government has brought the cocalero is the right to live well as
a full member of our society” (Farthing & Ledebur, 2015: 38). Although never ostracized by
their community, cocaleros are for the first time in the Chapare able to fully integrate within the
Bolivian state. To gain insight in how perception from the state has changed, it was necessary to
understand the perception of the interdictors as well as the campesinos. Alejandro told me when
asked about when they go out to raid the clandestine labs:
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Every morning at sunrise we go out to find the labs. We find about a dozen or so per day. We know for the
most part where the labs will be located. They're mostly up along the river bed, makeshift small operations
with cheap equipment.
Inside  the  walls  of  the  base,  the  bags  of  coca  found at  these  sites  were  piled  high.
According to Luis, they can burn the labs and the equipment but they cannot burn the coca as it
is seen as disrespectful, and thus must transport it all back to the base where it sits and rots. They
do occasionally find the larger more advanced pieces of equipment, such as large woodchippers
and cement mixers, which are used to macerate the coca instead of manual stomping (interview
Luis - see page: 9). 
As it had been ten years, none of the interviewees had experienced working under Plan
Dignidad. The unit had a high turnover rate, as it was made up of enlisted soldiers. All of the
narcopolicias interviewed were happy with the results of the cato program and staunchly against
returning to military intervention. However as they would like to reestablish ties with the DEA,
both Eduardo and Alejandro told me they would not  support Morales in  the then upcoming
election.1 They felt as though they lack proper funding without DEA sponsorship.2
Yet while the situation has improved for the cocaleros, the pichicateros, poor uneducated
migrants from other parts  of Bolivia working in the makeshift  labs are  still  stigmatized and
arrested. They are not represented by a sindicato, they have no political voice and work for very
little  money.  They  are  more  often  than  not  children  or  young  men,  with  no  land  and  few
alternatives. As so they take the greatest risks and receive the smallest compensation (Grisaffi,
2014).
1 The election was held on 12 October 2014, and Morales was re-elected with 61.36% of the vote.
2 Their rundown trucks and equipment have not been replaced since the DEA expulsion in 2008. Their water bottles
still had US insignia on them. 
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Local Perception
These interviews with the narcopolicias allowed me to identify another type of deviance I
had not considered prior to fieldwork, how the narcopolicias were treated in towns referred to as
narcopueblos.3 To the residents of these towns, the act of interdiction against the  cocaleros or
pichicateros is itself deviant behavior. Eduardo and Alejandro told me about how they were often
mobbed by the local  campesinos,  who would throw small projectiles and firecrackers to drive
them out, while allowing the pichicateros time to avoid arrest. The campesinos have essentially
formed what Goffman (1963: 169) calls a 'deviant community,' located within the state but with
nearly  complete  autonomy.  Of  the  three  narcopolicias interviewed,  none  were  from  the
Cochabamba department,  and they said they did not  have any colleagues  from the  Chapare
region. Therefore, like me they were all outsiders in the area.
Global Perception
The perception of Bolivia's deviance on the global level can have a profound effect in this
“ever-increasingly” globalized world. If Bolivia is perceived by the global community as not
complying with the UN treaties and allowing an unregulated  of coca, this could further justify
the international  use of violence.4 A step away from his  time as the leader  of a  movement,
president Morales has been forced to slowly divorce coca from Bolivian identity in his domestic
speeches, having to justify its continued eradication outside of the cato program (Grisaffi, 2010:
428).
Internationally the perception of the policy change has been mixed. Mary O'Grady's 2013
article in the Wall Street Journal labeled Bolivia a “rogue state:"
“With the opposition cowed, President Morales has turned Bolivia into an international hub of organized
crime and a  safe  haven for  terrorists.  The  U.S.  Drug Enforcement  Agency has  been  expelled.  United
3  I did not ask the campesinos their current opinion of the UMOPAR division, which could be expanded upon in
further research.
4  Economic sanctions and withholding aid, or for President George H.W. Bush's (1989), justifcation for invading
Panama.
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Nations data show that cocaine production is up in Bolivia since 2006 5 and unconfirmed reports say that
Mexican, Russian and Colombian toughs are showing up to get a piece of the action. So are militants
looking to raise cash and operate in the Western Hemisphere.”
To O'Grady, a state having diplomatic relations with Muslim nations6 makes them “a safe
haven for terrorists,” and any “black” people in Bolivia must be trafficking drugs through Africa.
O'Grady says that her unnamed  source said “the dying [black] man murmured the words "al-
Shabaab,"  the  name  of  the  Somali  terrorist  group,”  despite  "al-Shabaab"  being  an  entire
continent away from the West African drug trafficking route. 
The domestic account has also been polarized. An article in the Bolivian newspaper  El
Potosi claims  that  cocaine  production  sites  are  growing  “like  mushrooms”  and  that  the
“cocaleros are a class of  nouveau riche who spend their ill-gotten drug-money on luxury cars,
parties  and houses”  (Grisaffi,  2014).  Right-wing 2014 candidate  and former  president  Jorge
Quiroga  called  the  sindicatos “narcococaleros” and  accused  them  of  protecting  cocaine
production (Diputados, 2014).
Prior to the expulsion of the US  Ambassador and DEA in 2008 the US had a vested
interest in keeping up diplomatic relations in Bolivia and were accepting of the policy change in
the media. William Francisco III of the US Embassy's Narcotics Affairs section spoke out in
support of the cato program, "the fight for us is not against coca, rather against cocaine,” he says,
“we know that you all have used coca for millennia for its medicinal qualities, we only [want to]
help in the fight against drug trafficking" (Gordon, 2006, 20).
However after the expulsion, their rhetoric changed. In September 2015, US President
Barack  Obama  (2015)  “decertified”  Bolivia  for  the  eighth  consecutive  year,  declaring  that
Bolivia has “failed demonstrably during the previous 12 months to adhere to [its] obligations
under  international  narcotics  agreements.”  Decertification  allows  the  US  to  withdraw  aid
packages, and impose certain additional measures on a government that is deemed to not be
5  The last year the UN published data on cocaine production was in 2009. Using US data the numbers on cocaine
production have declined every year since (Youngers, 2013).
6  Namely Iran and Western Sahara.
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cooperating with American directives. Colorado, Washington, Oregon, and Uruguay, which have
also all recently legalized a substance controlled by the 1961 Convention were not mentioned in
the presidential decree. Morales responded to the White House's decision by characteristically
denouncing the US: "if we are honest, US policies are a failure in terms of the fight against drug
trafficking around the world" (as quoted in Oakford, 2015). 
Conversely, the UN seemingly broke away from the prohibitionist hegemony in January
2013, when Bolivia was successful in achieving a ‘special dispensation’ that stipulates:
The Plurinational State of Bolivia reserves the right to allow in its territory: traditional coca leaf chewing;
the consumption and use of the coca leaf in its natural state for cultural and medicinal purposes, such as its
use in infusions; and also the cultivation, trade and possession of the coca leaf to the extent necessary for
these licit purposes. At the same time, the Plurinational State of Bolivia will continue to take all necessary
measures to control the cultivation of coca in order to  prevent its abuse and the illicit production of the
narcotic drugs which may be extracted from the leaf (UN, 2013).
According to Farthing and Ledebur (2015: 32), “the UN's decision to accept Bolivia's
reservation reflected its recognition that it needed to bring drug control treaties into harmony
with other international standards” (see pg: 42). As prior to this decree the conventions have
“implicitly accepted that coca chewing is bad and that Indian communities and other users have
to be weaned from that habit for their own good” (Thoumi, 2005a: 302). Up until this point the
INCB was particularly critical of these policies. For instance, in their 2005 Annual Report they
'reminded' the parties that “the transitional measures regarding the licit cultivation of coca bush
and consumption of coca leaf under the 1961 Convention ended a long time ago” (as quoted in
Bewley-Taylor, 2012: 260).
Despite the progress made in the international community, Morales (2011) is still “afraid
of  the  United  States,  because  they  are  political  operators,”  and  believes  they  would  use  a
negative global perception of the program as justification to violate Bolivia's state sovereignty.
The perception of Bolivia's compliance to the international treaties is something that Morales has
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to be constantly wary of because, as Chapare  sindicato  leader Don Leonardo said, “thanks to
coca we are in power, but  coca could also  bring this government down” (Grisaffi, 2010: 428;
emphasis added).
Freedom
There  is  no  doubt  in  denying  the  importance  of  coca  in  Bolivian  culture.  Its  use
permeates all Bolivian social classes and ethnicities, and is used in discourse as signifier to unite
the pluri-nations behind. Eradicating coca is impossible, as Morales declared to the UN General
Assembly in 2006, “...zero coca-leaf production is equivalent to zero Quechuas, zero Aymarás,
zero Mojeños, zero Chiquitanos (the Bolivian indigenous groups).” In the Chapare as in all of
Bolivia this is the clearly the case. Coca use is ubiquitous on the streets and in the colectivos; it is
laid upon the sick, and offered up to Pachamama for her blessings. However, none of the sacred
coca used in the Chapare is grown in the Chapare.
 
Coca in the Chapare
Chapter 02 (pg. 13) offers a descriptive history of the 'sacrament' that is coca and how all
throughout  its  life-cycle  it  is  revered by the  cocalero.  However,  according to  anthropologist
Thomas Grisaffi, with coca grown in the Chapare, this is not the case (2010: 431):
“Coca  cultivation  in  the  Chapare  meanwhile  is  not  underlain  by  the  elaborate  understandings  and
practices... In contrast to the care with which coca is grown in the Yungas, the Chapare crop is doused with
fertiliser  and  pesticide,  and  when  harvested  it  is  ripped  from  the  branches  in  great  handfuls.  Ayni
meanwhile is disparagingly described as ‘a thing that we did in the time of the indígenas,’ a reference to the
Chapare peasants’ origins in the highlands. What is more, most people are unwilling to disclose the location
of their coca plantations to neighbours because of the danger that they might denounce them to the police.
As a result Ayni is an almost impossible form of labour relation in the Chapare.”  
On  the  way  from  Cochabamba  to  Villa  Tunari  there's  a  recently  constructed  yet
abandoned  factory  on  the  side  of  the  road  adorned  by  Evo's  face.  Willie,  a  teacher  from
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Cochabamba I met on the colectivo who was commuting to Villa Tunari for work, told me that it
was there to produce the various coca products, but there was never enough of a demand to
justify its large scale production.7 As I was told over and over, coca grown in the Chapare is
simply not fit for chewing, as Willie says it is just too bitter and the leaves are too tough.8 
Despite being nearly double the cost, coca from the Yungas already had an established
market to produce the many different products - from coca cookies to coca liquor - that are sold
around Bolivia.9 The Coca Cafe serving the Museo de Coca in La Paz is one of these places. Still
Luisa the barista told me all of their products came from coca from the Yungas.10 All subjects
asked in the Chapare were also consuming coca from the Yungas. Although according to Grisaffi
(2010: 17), “the Chapare  campesinos routinely portray coca leaf produced in other regions as
being only fit for the maceration pit."
A question I kept coming back to: “So where does all this coca go?” Mergim a foreigner I
met who lives in the Chapare, told me “it's a question that everyone knows the answer to but no
one is willing to admit.” I asked my informants about the licit market for their local coca, and
was unable to get a direct answer. Jose referred to the government licensed market in Sacaba,11
but he was unable give me a clear answer as to what it was being used for, or how much of his
coca is going there.
7 According to Karl Hoffman: “There just isn’t the local demand, and without international legalization, there won’t
be” (Kohl & Farthing, 2012). 
8 According to the CIA (1993) its bitterness is a consequence of its higher alkaloid content. If coqueros were truly
'addicted' to cocaine as the UN's 1951 report alleges, they would choose to consume the leaves with the higher
cocaine content, which is clearly not the case. I tried the coca from the Chapare, and it was definitely a different
texture but the taste was similar.
9  I had trouble finding coca products available in the local markets. Most of the coca products I tried where in the
coca musuem itself. Bolivians tend to just chew the leaves or drink the tea.
10 Although this was just hearsay. Perhaps that's what they tell their because its seen as better quality.
11 Yungas coca is sold to a market in La Paz which has full distribution rights on its product.
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Autonomy
However, “we must” says Marisol De La Cadena (2010: 359) “take indigenous politics in
their  own terms.”  As  Grisaffi  (2010:  436)  observes,  “being  an  ‘originario cocalero'12 is  an
identity  that  is  actively  assumed,  emphasised  and  modified  in  relation  to  the  prevailing
conditions.” They are not looking to return to “the time of the  indígenas,” but rather they are
after the what Sahlins calls (1999: 410) the 'indigenization of modernity,'  “their own cultural
space in the global scheme of things.” 
What is at stake in their struggle is not merely an 'indigenous' problem, and neither is it
only a racial, cultural, or economic problem, rather it is the realization of all of these at once
(Hardt  &  Negri,  2009:  108).  Grisaffi  (2010:  430)  refers  to  coca  being  used  as  an  'empty
signifier,'13 as the hegemonic representative of the collection of altermodern movements, rather
than  a  form of  unconscious  nativism; and  thus  cultivation  can  be  supplemented  when their
economic, social and identity needs are met.
At the political level coca for the MAS signifies political autonomy.14 Like many of their
global  counterparts  the  rhetoric  of  Bolivia's  altermodern  movement  has  focused  on  their
autonomy from 'US neoliberalism' and 'post-colonial' power structures. 
Discussing American involvement in Bolivia at a UN press conference in 2011, Morales said:
Do you think Obama would accept a contribution of the Bolivian Government for the Republican Party?
That is what the United States does in Bolivia. We do not accept this. It is a political interference. It is a
lack of respect for the Bolivian people and its Government.
The US unabashedly supports  the political  opposition of  leftist  governments  in  Latin
America  (Chomsky,  2000).  The  altermodern  rhetoric  from  Morales  paints  the  US  as  an
imperialist:
12 How the colonizers in the Chapare view themselves as Andean descendants.
13 See: On Populist Reason, Laclau, 2005: 69
14 Or “sovereignty” if it can be said to exist (Hardt & Negri, 2000: 93 ; Brown, 2010).
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“[Drug trafficking] must be fought — we are convinced of that — and we are doing so more effectively
and more wisely … When the United States was in control of counternarcotics, the US governments used
drug trafficking for purely geopolitical purposes …. The US uses drug trafficking and terrorism for political
control …. We have nationalized the fight against drug trafficking.”
While Morales may not disagree with the hegemonic ideology of the War on Drugs, or
eradicating coca aside from its legal use, he wants to “nationalize” it, for Bolivia to fight its own
war under its own terms.15
Development
In the 1983, (North) American film Scarface, Chapare16 resident and drug lord Alejandro
Sosa financed his lavish lifestyle with two warehouse-sized factories capable of producing 200
kilograms of cocaine every month. In reality, according to Grisaffi (2014) the drug lords17 in the
Chapare make around $2,000 per month, or less than an assistant manager at McDonald's. Most
people involved in the drug trade are  campesinos who are willing to risk the hazards of illicit
work because of a lack of an alternative:
“a 14 year-old pisa-coca described wading around in a toxic mulch of coca, gasoline, and acid for several
hours a day. The fumes gave him a terrible headache, and his flimsy rubber boots let in acid that turned his
toenails green.” (ibid)
These peasant  laborers are  willing to risk a minimum eight  years in prison and their
health for $300 per month, because the alternatives do not exist (ibid).
Drug production and development are inversely correlated. For the Chapare to abandon
coca  as  an  illicit  commodity,  it  will  be  integral  to  develop the  area  to  a  point  where  coca
15 “Indeed, individual states can no longer cope with drugs unilaterally, because drug traffickers via their ‘tentacles
now infiltrated all regions of the world’ “(United Nations, 1991 as quoted in Herschinger, 2012: 86).
16 While the term Chapare was not mentioned in the movie, he lived in the Tropics of 'Cochabamba.'
17 Hyperbole, “the top of the local production ladder”, the owners of the production sites.
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cultivation is no longer the rational choice.18 Supply regulation, according to US diplomat Robert
Gelbard, “can be a powerful force in advancing, rather than retarding, human rights objectives”
(HRW, 1995). While, past attempts at alternative development have failed because of their strict
adherence  to  the  all-or-nothing  ideology,  cocaleros would  be  forced  to  give  up  their  crops
completely to be allowed into the program. USAID spent an estimated $300 million between
1982 and 2008 on these programs that  refused to  work with the  sindicatos and conditioned
assistance on eradication (Farthing, 2004). Since 2006, the state and European Union  sponsored
program Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Alternativo (FONADAL), has been willing to work with
the sindicatos to 'ensure food security,' and thus has had more more success (Farthing & Ledebur,
2015: 45). The UNODC (2011: 47) has recorded a growth in alternative crops in the Chapare
since 2010, a feat that was never accomplished with any of the prior programs (Farthing &
Ledebur, 2015: 45).
There are many signs of continued economic development in the Chapare,  where the
government has invested $350 million since 2006 (Youngers & Ledebur, 2015: 7). The nicest
buildings in  the area (often to  the point  where they looked out  of  place)  were certainly the
schools.  At   food  science  technical  college  I  visited,  El  Centro  de  Formación  Tecnológica
“Eterazama” (CEFTE) the children  of  the  cocaleros19 were given an excellent  education in
creating alternative food products using beautifully new equipment, and qualified teachers. The
school  is  located  in  Eterazama,  an  area  where  pre-2004  illicit  cultivation  was  its  most
concentrated, and where much of the violence between the  sindicatos  and  narcopolicias took
place (interview – Juan Carlos). 
With the continued increase in price of domestically grown coca and the relatively stable
value of cocaine, less and less coca being grown in the Chapare is going to the illicit market (see
Table 02). As the Chapare settlers acknowledge, they only got into the coca business because of
the lack of alternatives after the crisis in the mid-eighties, and thus the market might just price
itself out (Grisaffi, 2010: 430). 
18 A longer study could be conducted on the effects on earnings, education, and child labor etc., the later of which
Bolivia legalized in 2014 to protect children already working with union rights (Fontana & Grugel 2015).
19 Interview: Juan Carlos Coca, Academic Director CEFTE 
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Ecology
Despite Morales' continued assertion of the importance of the environment in indigenous
culture, in June 2015 he greenlit a highway that bisects the the  Territorio Indígena y Parque
Nacional Isiboro Secure (TIPNIS), an indigenous zone and national park.  Advocacy groups are
worried of the potential deforestation (which has been estimated up to 64% of the national park)
and  the  further  colonization  of  indigenous  land  by  the  highlanders  (Achtenberg,  2013:  7).
Nevertheless, Morales considered the economic benefits of the road, which would traverse the
Chapare and connect the departments of the Benin and Cochabamba, to outweigh the potential
harms (Canessa, 2014). 
However, coca production in TIPNIS and the adjacent  Parque Nacional Carrasco has
nearly been eliminated. According to the UNODC, only 1% of Bolivia’s coca crop is in protected
areas (214 out of 20,400 hectares), which constitutes a 90% percent reduction in the past two
years (UNODC, 2015: 33). This is in contrast from before the launch of the cato program, where
41% of coca cultivated in  the Chapare was located in  protected areas  (UNODC, 2005:  49).
However the production of cocaine along the banks of the Amazon tributaries is still leading to
contamination from the effluents, but as there is no data available it is difficult to assess the
environmental  damage  caused,  or  how  it  compares  to  the  aerial  fumigation  of  previous
eradication programs. 
Collaboration
A story from the New York Times offers a stark contrast from past abuses:
“On a recent morning just after dawn, a squad of uniformed soldiers used machetes to cut down a plot of
coca plants near the town of Ivirgarzama. They had come to chop down an old coca patch that had passed
its prime and measure a replacement plot planted by the farmer. The soldiers determined that the new plot
was slightly over the limit and removed about two rows of plants before going on their way.” Neuman 2005
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“Before, there was more tension, more conflict, more people injured.” UMOPAR Lt. Col.
Willie Pozo refers to the years of forced eradication,  “this is no longer a war.” With their societal
cohesion,  economic  opportunities  and  autonomy  needs  met,  cocaleros  no  longer  have  the
incentive to rebel. According to Nicolas, while interdiction against the cocaleros in the Chapare
has been non-existent, there is still violence down the commodity chain.
Supply
[Table 01 - UNODC, 2015]
According to the most recent UNODC report which was released in August of 2015,
Bolivia has nearly eliminated illicit coca cultivation (UNODC, 2015). This study shows a mere
400 hectares more than the allowed limit of 20,000 hectares20 (214 of which were in the national
park). Since the country's high in 2010 of 31,000 hectares, Bolivia has returned back to pre-cato
figures. While there are only around 400 hectares of coca cultivated outside of the program, a
20 UNODC representative Antonino De Leo: the Bolivian government, “can’t go below 20,000 hectares without
generating conflict.” (Youngers & Ledebur, 2015: 14).
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2013 report released by the Bolivian government says that 14,705 hectares of coca are needed to
supply the domestic demand (Bolivia, 2013).21 
Production and Commercialization of Coca 2004-2014
[Table 02: Reprinted from UNODC, 2015]
According to the UN, around 20,000 metric tons of coca reached the authorized market
Dirección General de la Hoja de Coca Industrialización (DIGCOIN), while 13,300 were still left
unaccounted for. While the amount of coca in DIGCOIN has been fairly consistent since 2008,
the amount of unauthorized production has been in decline.
Social Control
Aside from the economic benefits and threats of prosecution, the program utilizes the
four mechanisms of Hirschi's (1969: 16) social control theory. It develops attachment, by
bringing the once ostracized back into their communities and the state. It fosters commitment to
the cato because they designed the program, they fought for the right for decades, and now they
feel as if they own it.  They decided that if they exceed their limit they will lose their cato, it was
21 With each hectare estimated to produce 1,475 kilos of coca leaf per year to satisfy a 20,690 ton domestic demand
for coca and coca products.
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not a restriction imposed by the state.22 Furthermore, the program encourages involvement in
other activities, such as the alternative development programs, and it gives the cocaleros
something to believe in; Evo Morales, the altermodern MAS movement and legalized coca.
Morales has continued this push for international legalization, as an effort to continue to
fight drug trafficking and to respect their cultural and economic rights.23 Morales' international
crusade gives the  cocaleros  something to  believe in “If we respect the  cato,” says  sindicato
leader Eddie Godoy, “it is additional support for our president who is working so hard to make
coca legal” (Farthing & Ledebur, 2005: 38). 
Of course many cocaleros are not satisfied with the amount and want to increase the size
of  the  cato.  According  to  Miguel,  many  cocaleros  do  not  consider  the  negative  effects  of
increased production, and with the rising price of coca they want to be allowed to cultivate more.
Local sindicato leader Don Jose echoed the sentiment in 2010:
"It’s true, with the cato [the price of coca] has gone up, but still people miss it. Before... a person would
have three, four or five hectares of coca and some are even complaining now! They cannot accept just one
cato and they say Evo ‘que cujodo eres!’(What an idiot you are!) Some people do not even have a cato
just half a cato or none at all, others well they still have three hectares, but they hide it ‘adentro’ (deep in
the jungle)” (Grisaffi, 2010: 430). 
However as I experienced by attending a local political rally in Cochabamba in 2014,
Bolivia's strong civil society gives them an open platform to express these concerns (Faguet,
2004: 870). These communal rallies are a form of radical democracy (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985),
where all voices are heard and not just the majority wins.
22 According to Deputy Minister of Social Defense and Controlled Substances, Felipe Caceres, as of mid-July 2014,
more than 800 cocaleros have lost the right to the cato program because of non-compliance (Opinion, 2014).
23 Decocainized products are legal internationally under the 1961 Convention after the sucessful lobbying efforts of
Coca Cola, and Bolivia started to produce decocainized products for the internation market in 2015. Coca used in




Cocaine is not something thought of often in Bolivia,  To modern Bolivians coca has
solidified its place as a cultural icon whereas cocaine is “North America's problem” (interview –
Miguel).  Bolivians  infrequently  use  cocaine  in  its  pure  form,  its  domestic  use  mostly
concentrated on backpacker drug tourism, centered around the legend of the cocaine bar Route
36 of which I have heard much about on my earlier expeditions down the Gringo Trail (Busby,
2015). In contrast to Colombia where the negatives effects of basuco24 are seen glaringly on the
streets of the major cities, and cocaine use is a growing fad amongst the upper middle class as a
consequence of globalization (Americanization).
Instead the market  for the cocaine isolate  largely lies outside of Bolivia's  borders,  in
Brazil (which is now the number two consumer in the world after the US), and further down the
commodity chain in the growing European market.25 Despite Bolivia's progressive policies with
the cocaleros in the Chapare, through their “coca yes, cocaine no,” policy they have continued
with the tradition of harsh interdiction against cocaine producers and suppliers. 
As the price of coca in Bolivia is twice as much as that in Colombia or Peru (Farthing &
Ledebur,  2015: 44),  much of Peruvian supply is  transported into Bolivia  for production and
distribution. Bolivian minister Hugo Moldiz estimates  that only 5% of cocaine in Bolivia was
grown  in  Bolivia,  whereas  the  rest  is  grown  in  Peru  (El  Mundo,  2015),26 while  official
government sources give a more realistic figure of around 60% (Youngers, 2015: 11). 
In true Sisyphean form, after the 2013 'embarrassing'  news that Peru was leading the
world in coca cultivation, the US government pledged a record $100 million in 'aid,' and Peru
will up its eradication efforts to try to cut in half its total crop outages (Gootenberg, 2014: 49).
These efforts will take place as forced manual eradication in the Valle de los Ríos Aprímac, Ene y
24 Cocaine base;  See Chapter 01,  Extraction.  I  took a wrong turn into a abandoned rundown neighborhood in
Bogota,  where people were selling and smoking  basuco in  between heaps of  rubbish.  Although Santa Cruz  in
Bolivia may be the exception.
25 Bolivian cocaine also accounts for around 5% of the US market (UNODC).
26 "Solo un cinco por ciento de esa cantidad se produce en Bolivia, el resto es cocaína peruana", sostuvo el ministro
Hugo Moldiz [My translation].
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Mantara (VRAEM), an economically destitute area that has been colonized by coca to fulfill the
needs of their population over the last two decades. 
Systemic Violence
There is a growing homicide rate in Bolivia,27 which critics have pointed to as the failure
of  the  government  to  control  drug  trafficking.28 However,  cross-country  evidence  suggests,
homicide  rates  do  not  correlate  with  a  lack  of  government  intervention,  but  rather  that  the
opposite is true; homicide rates are positively correlated to the intensity of supply enforcement
(see Miron, 2001). 
In an effort to gain international recognition and legislative support for the cato program
and further liberalization, Bolivia continues to crack down harshly on all stages of production
and transportation of cocaine (Youngers & Ledebur, 2015: 14). According to a Fuerza Especial
de Lucha contrael Narcotráfico (FELCN) commander,  “we have a government mandate to focus
more  on  micro-trafficking,  and  we  are  coordinating  with  parent  groups,  school  groups,
municipalities and so on ... we are engaged in a full-fledged assault on street-level drug dealing,”
(Youngers & Ledebur, 2015: 10). This has resulted in an increase in poor, low-level, nonviolent
offenders  being criminalized and incarcerated  (ibid).  They have also stepped up interdiction
along the Peruvian border, allowing the military to shoot down planes thought to be importing
coca paste (ibid: 11).  Despite the  harm minimization concepts working well  in the Chapare,
Bolivia continues to adhere to the hegemonic ideology of strict prohibition elsewhere, and the
cycle of violence continues.
This chapter serves as an analysis of the cato program, its strengths and its limitations.
The following chapter will conclude the project and summarize the results.
  
27 Although 2012 was the last year the UNODC has released data for (UNODC, 2013).
28 See again, O'Grady, 2013.
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06 Conclusion
“If men were born free, they would, so long as they remained free,
form no conception of good and evil.” - Spinoza
In her 2010 book Vibrant Matter, Jane Bennett asks the question, “what would happen to
our thinking about nature if we experienced materialities as actants, and how would the direction
of public policy shift if it attended more carefully to their trajectories and powers?” If the thing-
power of coca were taken into consideration, the hegemonic metrology of using figures, tables,
and charts to reduce a complex assemblage to easily digestible numbers would shift towards a
framework of ethnographic understanding in an effort to fully measure the network of all bodies
and their relationships.
“A war to create and maintain social order can have no end,” say Hardt and Negri (2004:
14) instead, “it must involve the continuous, uninterrupted exercise of power and violence.” This
is a war that can never be won, a war that one cannot be sure is even a war at all (Gregory, 2011:
247); a war on a vague abstract concept defined by centuries of colonial racism. There is no evil
to be eradicated in this war, there are no haplessly enslaved consumers in need of protection from
a scourge;1 its targets rather, the drug producers and traffickers2 must be seen as human beings
1 But rather rational actors who make the choice between the suffering in life and the risks of use (Hart et al., 2001).
2 Hardt and Negri  (2009) try to distance drug cartels and terrorists from their idea of altermodern movements,
because they believe they have hierarchical structures, which appears to be more the authors' moral bias.  
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left with few alternatives, and their products as complex and powerful commodities that will
never be eliminated as long as the need exists.
From the  Inca3 we  could  learn  that  instead  of  ordering  our  laws  and  morals  in  the
hierarchical  binaries  of  good/evil  and  sacred/profane,  we  could  foster  a  culture  where  all
substances can be revered and respected, a shift to the alimentary ethics of moderation4 rather
than  the  current  hegemonic  ideology  of  abstinence  and  prohibition.  According  to  peace
researcher  Roger  Mac  Ginty  (2008:  156),  instead  of  being  given  the  space  to  work  within
Empire,  these  indigenous  peacebuilding  and traditional  approaches  must  be  co-opted  by the
hegemonic ideology, as parallel movements lie outside the control of imperial sovereignty and
are thus resisted.
Policy
In  October  2015  a  UNODC  briefing  paper  was  released  which  advocated  for  the
decriminalization5 of all controlled substances:
The international drug control conventions do not impose on Member States obligations to criminalise drug
use  and  possession  for  personal  consumption.  Member  States  should  consider  the  implementation  of
measures to promote the right to health and to reduce prison-overcrowding, including by decriminalising
drug use and possession for personal consumption, … Ensuring that their existing legislation, policies and
enforcement practices are up-to-date with respect to scientific evidence on drug use, drug dependence, HIV
and conform to  international human rights obligations. Investing more resources in science, evidence
and human rights-based interventions, including drug use prevention, treatment of drug dependence and
other harm reduction interventions (emphasis added).
While the UNODC later came out and said this was not an official statement, it reflects at
least a partial shift in ideology from the organization. As the UNGASS summit approaches, there
3 See page 14
4 An ethics  that  values  enkrateia, having control  over  oneself,  rather  than one assuming the individual  has  no
control (see Foucault, 1985).
5 Decriminialization is the removal of criminal punishment for the user, which is not the same as legalizaiton.
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is hope for a global paradigm change, one that takes into account the rights of all parties while
trying to minimize the harms of drug use and interdiction.
As discussed in Chapter 05 the cato program has shown that it respects the human rights
of the local population in the Chapare, while also controlling the supply of coca. However, it is
difficult to apply causality to the program without being able to control for outside factors (such
as the price drop and wide availability of Peruvian cocaine undercutting the market). While the
thing-power  of  coca  certainly  does  stem  from  the  indígenas,  this  study  has  shown  coca
production is governed more by its social controls and economic value, than by blind nativism or
indigenous politics. As Bolivia makes up only a fraction of the potential coca growing regions in
the Andes, analyzing the mechanisms at play as well as the deliberative processes involved in its
creation  will  be  integral  in  understanding  how  to  see  similar  results  all  throughout  the
commodity chain. A policy such as this one will not work as a blanket imposition, but instead the
civil society in other cultivation areas must be allowed autonomy to develop their own control
programs. 
Summary
“The results speak for themselves,” says the Bolivian Minister of the Presidency Carlos Romero, “we have
demonstrated  that  you  can  objectively  do  eradication  work  without  violating  human  rights,  without
polemicizing the topic and with clear results” (Neuman, 2012).
By engaging the hegemonic discourse and injecting their  own indigenous beliefs and
customs, Bolivia can be said to be undergoing a peaceful process of decolonization. The aim of
this project was to develop a socio-biological understanding of coca and to analyze Bolivia's
cato program  using  the  Peace  Studies  paradigm.  After  a  brief  introduction,  I  explored  the
chemical and pharmacological properties of coca and cocaine in Chapter 01. In Chapter 02, I
constructed a genealogy of the substances to further understand their place in political discourse.
I detailed the methodology of data collection at both home and in the field in Chapter 03 and in
Chapter 04 I outlined Galtung's conflict triangle and its relation to coca control. In Chapter 05 I
76
presented the results of this study, of which I found that the program has worked very well in
respecting the rights of the local population, while at the same time properly controlling coca
destined  for  the  cocaine  market. However,  as  successful  coca  control  policies  often  just
destabilize the market without having any noticeable effect on price or purity measures, 'winning'
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